On January 14, 1963, French President Charles de Gaulle caught everyone by surprise with a press conference in which he vetoed British entry into the Common Market and flatly ruled out French participation in a NATO multilateral force. Not knowing that de Gaulle and West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer were just days away from springing another surprise–the Franco-German Treaty of 1963 (also known as the Élysée Treaty), former Secretary of State Dean Acheson telegrammed Adenauer directly, appealing to him to try to persuade de Gaulle to backtrack on the veto.
Dean Acheson was called on by President Kennedy to help with the administration policies on Berlin, NATO, and Cuba, but he did so as a private citizen and ad hoc advisor.
In the wake of French President Charles de Gaulle’s January 14, 1963, press conference in which he vetoed British entry into the Common Market and ruled out French participation in a NATO multilateral force, former Secretary of State Dean Acheson wrote President Kennedy a memorandum outlining his views.
This August 1964 intelligence report was part of an annual series prepared by the US intelligence community assessing the situation on Fidel Castro’s Cuba.
In this Special Intelligence Estimate submitted in May 1964, the intelligence community assessed the likelihood that the Cubans or Soviets might shoot down a U-2 surveillance plane over Cuba.
This National Intelligence Estimate submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and the US Intelligence Board in June 1963, about 8 months after the Cuban Missile Crisis, was the annual update to its overall situation in Cuba.
This Special National Intelligence Estimate prepared by the CIA in February 1963 in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis assesses the likely reactions if the United States resumed it’s low-level Blue Moon surveillance missions over Cuba. The last low-level mission before this report was flown on November 15, 1962.
In this Special National Intelligence Estimate in November 1962, in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Director of Central Intelligence and the USIB assessed Cuba’s capabilities for aiding and instigating subversion against other Latin American countries.
In this National Intelligence Estimate, Director of Central Intelligence John McCone and the U.S. Intelligence Board studied the situation and prospects in Cuba.
In July 1964, President Johnson ordered a review of the risk of another Cuban Missile Crisis happening and for an outline of the alternative courses of action that would be available.
In National Security Action Memorandum No. 311 (NSAM 311), President Johnson ordered Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, and Director of Central Intelligence John McCone to review the prospect of a repeat of the Cuban Missile Crisis and to outline the various alternatives that would be available if it happened.
This history of the National Security Council under presidents Kennedy and Johnson was written by the Executive Director of the NSC under both presidents, Bromley Smith. It traces not just the mechanics of the NSC during the period but also how it was used to tackle specific topics.
A study by the US Air Force Historical Division on Air Force plans, policies, and operations in South Vietnam during the period 1961-63.
This study, prepared by the US Air Force and originally classified, focuses on US Air Force plans and policies in the war in Southeast Asia in South Vietnam and Laos in 1964.
This study for the US Air Force examines the U.S. Air Force role in five crises in the late 1950s through mid-1960s: Lebanon, Taiwan Straits, Congo, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the Dominican Republic.
On December 17, 1963, shortly after President Kennedy’s assassination, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara gave NATO ministers a top secret briefing on the state of U.S. nuclear weapons and policy and reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to NATO under the new president.
With the Kennedy administration concerned about the political and economic direction of Brazil under President Goulart, the State Department prepared recommendations for dealing with Brazil in the short-term. It was presented by U.S. Ambassador to Brazil Lincoln Gordon at the 35th ExComm meeting on December 11, 1962.
In a TV interview in Havana on the evening of November 1, 1962, Cuban Premier Fidel Castro provided a detailed account of his meetings with Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations U Thant, who had been in Cuba for two days of talks in the immediate aftermath of the Cuban Missiles Crisis. It includes a long section where Castro reads what is purported to be a transcript of one of their meetings.
At its 35th meeting, the ExComm departed from its usual topic of Cuba to discuss Brazil. Under consideration was a paper by U.S. Ambassador to Brazil Lincoln Gordon about short term policy towards the government of President Goulart. It was decided that Robert Kennedy would go to Brazil as President Kennedy’s emissary and push for changes in the political and economic orientation of Goulart’s government.
The text of the original Skybolt agreement signed by President Dwight Eisenhower and British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan on March 29, 1960, at Camp David. It also covered Polaris and the use of the Scottish submarine base Holy Loch, west of Glasgow.
A detailed narrative of the CIA’s post-mortem assessment of the Cuban Missile Crisis. It includes very useful summaries of the nature and chronology of the Soviet buildup as well as what and how U.S. intelligence analysts knew about it.
Soviet First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers Anastas Mikoyan had just returned from a long and difficult mission to Cuba to help repair the damage caused by the outcome of the Cuban Missile Crisis. President Kennedy was schedule to meet him later in the day. McGeorge Bundy prepared a talking points paper.
This file was used in the briefing book for the meeting between JFK and British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan when they met at Nassau in the Bahamas on December 18-21, 1962. That meeting was most famous for the Skybolt controversy.
Tucked away in the files of the Pre-Presidential papers at the LBJ Library is a fascinating little collection of notes on the ExComm meetings during the Cuban Missile Crisis and its aftermath.
A consolidated summary of intelligence compiled by the CIA on February 1, 1963. Topics include the Cuban situation, Soviet economy, Sino-Mongolian relations, the Congo, Togo, Iran, Indonesia-Malaysia relations, South Korea, Italy, Denmark’s Faeroe Islands problem, Brazil’s new Cabinet, Argentina’s financial crisis, the Chinese Navy, and Turkey’s first five-year plan.
Here are the results of a Mandatory Review request I filed with the LBJ Library in 2010 for declassifying closed sections of LBJ’s so-called “X” file on Richard Nixon, the bombing halt, and the 1968 election.
This was a publicly released statement by Director of Central Intelligence John McCone. It was designed to silence the growing criticism from some members of Congress such as Senator Strom Thurmond (D-South Carolina) and Senator Kenneth Keating (R-New York) about the continued Soviet military presence in Cuba. With the criticism peaking in early February 1963, the administration made a concerted effort to be more publicly transparent about what it knew about the Soviet forces still in Cuba and what had been removed.
A 1954 memorandum discussing the risk of an enemy smuggling a suitcase-style atomic bomb into the United States.
The Central Intelligence Briefing for September 19, 1963, including the Daily Brief. Topics include efforts to seat China at the United Nations, Chad, USSR, Algeria, South Africa, Congo, Iraq, Egypt, Israel, & Turkey.
The Central Intelligence Briefing for July 26, 1963, including the Daily Brief. Topics include South Vietnam, Egypt, Morocco, Common Market, France and NATO, and Venezuela.
The Central Intelligence Briefing for June 22, 1963, including the Daily Brief. Topics include Soviet leadership, and Sino-Soviet rift.
The Central Intelligence Briefing for April 24, 1963, including the Daily Brief. Topics include Haiti, Bolivia, UK trade with USSR, and Venezuela.
As the Indian defenses crumbled in the face of the Chinese assault, Prime Minister Nehru sent two highly sensitive and remarkable letters to President Kennedy asking for help in fighting China.
With Indian troops being pushed back along the border by Chinese assaults, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru sent a remarkable call for help to President John F. Kennedy. Given the sensitivity of the letter, it remained classified by the Indian government until very recently.
This was the first of two letters Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru sent to President Kennedy on November 19, 1962, on the situation in the Sino-Indian War.
The Central Intelligence Briefing for December 17, 1962, including the Daily Brief. Topics include Sino-Soviet rift, Soviet block shipping to Cuba, disarmament, Brazil, Malaya-Singapore, Southern Rhodesia, and Belgium.