This August 1964 intelligence report was part of an annual series prepared by the US intelligence community assessing the situation on Fidel Castro’s Cuba.
In this Special Intelligence Estimate submitted in May 1964, the intelligence community assessed the likelihood that the Cubans or Soviets might shoot down a U-2 surveillance plane over Cuba.
This National Intelligence Estimate submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and the US Intelligence Board in June 1963, about 8 months after the Cuban Missile Crisis, was the annual update to its overall situation in Cuba.
In this Special National Intelligence Estimate in November 1962, in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Director of Central Intelligence and the USIB assessed Cuba’s capabilities for aiding and instigating subversion against other Latin American countries.
In this National Intelligence Estimate, Director of Central Intelligence John McCone and the U.S. Intelligence Board studied the situation and prospects in Cuba.
In July 1964, President Johnson ordered a review of the risk of another Cuban Missile Crisis happening and for an outline of the alternative courses of action that would be available.
In National Security Action Memorandum No. 311 (NSAM 311), President Johnson ordered Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, and Director of Central Intelligence John McCone to review the prospect of a repeat of the Cuban Missile Crisis and to outline the various alternatives that would be available if it happened.
This study for the US Air Force examines the U.S. Air Force role in five crises in the late 1950s through mid-1960s: Lebanon, Taiwan Straits, Congo, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the Dominican Republic.