

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 91-164

Saturday afternoon 4:30

By JW, NARA, Date 1-5-94

Pres. - Gov. appreciated your coming down - Be sure we move with direction and decision. We may find missiles out but don't know where they are - hostile atmosphere - refugees - bring to attention of Russia that we are going to hold them to their agreement, missiles must go - we must know how they went - bombers must go -

Rusk - most decisive deception since '45 - must not go thru 2nd round of deception. Verification essential to peace.

McCone

Missiles dismantled to unknown possibility. Missiles may have been concealed - may store them in caves - very large caves - easily stored in caves. Some weight on deception in operation ⁴⁸ because trucks not running on highways - USSR may have planned & may still plan to have a submarine base in Cuba - Soviet may not abandon Cuba but develop this valuable piece of real estate.

Pres. - we have a draft set of instructions - Pres. read tough draft of instructions. Pres. says Gov. what is your thought? Gov. Stevenson. We might review with you the problems that are outstanding with Soviets & U.N.

(a) Red Cross inspections on incoming shipments. This could be done by series of letters - lots of discussion # of questions however in view of Soviet govt. statement could not undertake this if Russia, Cuba & U.S. & all flags involved.

(b) Verification on ground

(c) Alternatives

(d) O.A.S. procedure if any

Ask Yost to bring you up to date on ships.

Yost says Soviet wants inspection to consist of only Hail & Pass - procedure, but I'm sure we can move them from this position.

Stevenson

2nd question - verification on ground - Khrushchev says can have verification at end - we are insisting on verification thru and at end. McCloy handling this on ground he should not explain status of negotiation.

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McCloy

We must continue area surveys, etc. If they can't arrange with Castro then how do they give us this guarantee - manifest suggested by Wash. - we think not very satisfactory - we should press for on site inspection. Think it essential we cover east side of island - submarines will bring up with Kuznetsov tomorrow - sent him by hand to effect IL-28's still being uncrated - think should press Kuznetsov to press Castro for on site inspections. I find no difficulties in pressing these demands - verification on ground at end - not only verification of site but verification of removal - if Castro refuses only thing

Stevenson

we can do is examine ingoing & outgoing manifests or examine at sea & how far (open crates, etc?)

Ball

If Russia wants Castro to cooperate they can make him 80% of his trade is with Russia.

Taylor says ask Russia what is your withdrawal plan. Stevenson problem is not with the Soviets but with Castro.

Point 3

(3) Assurance against future exchanges paragraph 1 & 2 of Kennedy letter. Nowhere in Khrushchev letter. Pres. says we should get agreement on overflights - Lead man only Russian on SAMs sites - rest are Cubans - Adlai says we have no assurance that we will not be molested. Stevenson's alternatives - 1. Nuclear force Latin American proposal of Brazil, (2) Commission to study. Pres. says we must have proposals on future assurances. U.S. guarantee against invasion must be conditioned on satisfactory guarantee against reintroduction of weapons - Air surveillance is the easiest. Must find another proposal - Stevenson says personally has no doubt but what they will take them out thru Brazil to Dakar - fly them out - McCloy says maybe see Mikoyan next few days - more advantages in seeing him than not to see him. McCloy recommends - psychological advantages - Rusk says if basket full should see him if mean no -

Pres.

Held off until
end of week.

(4) Security Council procedure

Simple exchange of
letters on Red Cross.

(5) OAS procedure

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Ball - we should ask for performance! Art 6 Rio Post says Protect Peace of Hemisphere. If Castro issues orders to blow up L.A. we can't agree not to invade him.

McNamara

Can't overemphasize importance IL-28 - Press & force answer. 40 planes there (Cuba) IL-28's - 9 uncrated - Johnson - Have they ever admitted bombers offensive weapon - No - always say missiles & bombers & offensive weapons. Taylor - we must overfly tomorrow U 2 (serious).

What should be our public position next few days -

Pres. letter Oct. 27 - (background) Never did accept - then Pres. wrote him he understood acceptance - Ctro did not accept by word or deed -

Nuclear Testing

Saturday
November 3, 1962

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

Saturday afternoon 4:30

Pres - for appointment of our coming down - Be sure we move with direction & decisions - We may find ourselves out but don't know where they are - hostile atmosphere - Refuses - bring to attention of Keesee that we are going to hold them to their agreement, another must go - We must know how they want - bombers must go -

Recall - most decisive deception June 45 - Must not go thru 2nd round of deception. Verification essential to peace -

Misdear discredited to unknown possibility - Misdear may have been concealed - May store them in case - Very large cases - likely stored in case, some weight on deception

THE WHITE HOUSE

48
 We operation - because trusts not running in highways - US SR may have planned & may still plan to have a submarine base in Cuba - Soviet may not abandon Cuba - don't develop this valuable piece of real estate - Pres - We have a draft set of instructions - Pres read tough draft instructions for Stevenson - We might discuss with you the problems that are outstanding with Soviet & U.S.

(a) Red Cross inspection on incoming shipments - This could be done by series of letters - lots of discussion # of questions however in view of Soviet part of statement could not undertake this if Keesee asked & US & all things involved (1) Verification on ground (2) Allthurs (3) O.D. procedure if any. Pres agreed to bring up to date on this.

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 By JW/ks, NARA, Date 1-5-94

Spit - says Soviet wants inspection to consist of only
Hail & Pass Procedure but in here we can move
them from this position.

2nd problem - Verification on ground - Kuchuk says
we have verification at end - We are insisting on
verification thro & at end. Mc Clay handling this on
ground he should work on plain status of inspection

Mc Clay -
We must continue dead survey etc. If they cut
away with Castro then how do they give us this
insurance - Manifest suggested by Wash -
We think not very satisfactory - We should
press for on site inspection. Think it
essential we cover East side of island -

Submarine will bring up with Kuchuk
tomorrow ~~spit~~ him by hand to effect
I & J still being generated - Think should press
Kuchuk to press Castro for on site inspections

I find no difficulties in pursuing these demands -
Verification on ground at end -

Not only Verification of site but Verification
of removal - If Castro refuses only thing
we can do is ^{Stevenson} impose ^{insisting} ^{to bring}
manifests or examine at sea & how far
(Open Crates etc)

Ball
If Russia wants Castro to cooperate they can make him
goup of his trade is with Russia

Topol says we Russia what is your withdrawal
German problem is not with Soviet but with Castro

Point 3.
Assurance against future exchange
Paragraph 1 & 2 of Kennedy letter, nowhere in
Kuchuk letter. Pres says we should get agreement
on overflights - And man only Russian or Soviet

Notes - next are Contours - ^{Stalin says we have no} assurance that we will not be ^{industrial} industrial.
Stalin's Alternatives - 1. Nuclear free Latin America
proposal of Project (2) Commission of ^{States} States.

Phes says we must have proposals on future assurance

U.S. guarantee against ^{invasion} invasion
must be conditional on ^{sterilization} sterilization
Guarantee against re introduction
of weapons - Air surveillance is the

crucial. What kind another proposal -
Stimson says personally he has no doubt but what
they will tell them out thro' Project to Deter
fly them out - McChy says maybe see
McKoy on next few days - more advantages
in seeing him - than not to see him. See Clay
Recommendations - Psychological advantages - look
Davis if looked full should see him if mean no -

Phes

- 4 Security Council procedure - ^{1st of United} end of next week
- 5 OAS procedure ^{sample exchange of} letters on Red Cross -

Roll - we should ask for performance!
Art & Rio ford says Protect Peace of Hemisphere
of Centro issues orders to bleed up L.A.
We can't agree not to invade him -

McNamara
Can't overcomplicate ^{importance} of L 288 - Pass force laws
40 of L 288 - 9 converted - John H. H. H.

even admitted Bombers offensive beyond - 100
Always new missiles & Bombers & Oppenheimer McGeorge
Taylor - We must verify tomorrow U 2 (China)

THE WHITE HOUSE -

What should be our public position

next few days -

Pres letter Oct 27 - (background)

never did accept - Then I wrote

him he understood acceptance -

(he did not, by ^{accept} word to deal

Nuclear testing)