This Special National Intelligence Estimate prepared by the CIA in February 1963 in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis assesses the likely reactions if the United States resumed it’s low-level Blue Moon surveillance missions over Cuba. The last low-level mission before this report was flown on November 15, 1962.
In July 1964, President Johnson ordered a review of the risk of another Cuban Missile Crisis happening and for an outline of the alternative courses of action that would be available.
In National Security Action Memorandum No. 311 (NSAM 311), President Johnson ordered Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, and Director of Central Intelligence John McCone to review the prospect of a repeat of the Cuban Missile Crisis and to outline the various alternatives that would be available if it happened.
A detailed narrative of the CIA’s post-mortem assessment of the Cuban Missile Crisis. It includes very useful summaries of the nature and chronology of the Soviet buildup as well as what and how U.S. intelligence analysts knew about it.
Soviet First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers Anastas Mikoyan had just returned from a long and difficult mission to Cuba to help repair the damage caused by the outcome of the Cuban Missile Crisis. President Kennedy was schedule to meet him later in the day. McGeorge Bundy prepared a talking points paper.
A consolidated summary of intelligence compiled by the CIA on February 1, 1963. Topics include the Cuban situation, Soviet economy, Sino-Mongolian relations, the Congo, Togo, Iran, Indonesia-Malaysia relations, South Korea, Italy, Denmark’s Faeroe Islands problem, Brazil’s new Cabinet, Argentina’s financial crisis, the Chinese Navy, and Turkey’s first five-year plan.
This was a publicly released statement by Director of Central Intelligence John McCone. It was designed to silence the growing criticism from some members of Congress such as Senator Strom Thurmond (D-South Carolina) and Senator Kenneth Keating (R-New York) about the continued Soviet military presence in Cuba. With the criticism peaking in early February 1963, the administration made a concerted effort to be more publicly transparent about what it knew about the Soviet forces still in Cuba and what had been removed.