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**Castro's Subversive Capabilities
in Latin America**

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CASTRO'S SUBVERSIVE CAPABILITIES IN LATIN AMERICA

THE PROBLEM

To describe and evaluate Castro's capabilities, with Soviet help, for carrying out subversion and sabotage in Latin America after satisfaction of all US conditions relative to the withdrawal of strategic weapons systems from Cuba and a consequent US commitment not to invade.

NOTE: In this estimate we have considered Castro's raw capabilities, taking note of, but not working out in detail, US and Latin American capabilities for counteraction.

SUMMARY

A. The dangerously unstable situation that prevails throughout much of Latin America is the product of fundamental inequities and historic circumstances; it is not the creation of Castro and the Soviets. Castro's efforts, with Soviet help, to exploit this situation by means of subversion and sabotage have not produced significant results. Propaganda exploitation of Castro and Cuba as symbols of revolution has probably been more effective to date than other subversive activities. Castro's influence in Latin America had waned by the time of the missile base crisis and was further reduced by the revelation that he had accepted Soviet strategic missile bases on Cuban soil and by the manner of the Soviet decision to withdraw them.

B. Implementation of an agreement between the US and the USSR whereby the strategic weapons systems would be withdrawn and the US committed not to intervene in Cuba with force will leave Castro with a new immunity and a greater freedom

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for subversive actions throughout Latin America. The extent to which this potential is realized will depend upon the situation in Cuba, Soviet policy toward Cuba, and the policies and performance of the other Latin American governments and of the US with respect to the Castro threat. There are many targets in the hemisphere vulnerable to Castro-Communist subversion and sabotage, and the Soviets are likely to assist Castro in reaching them by contributing both to his security at home and to his capability for action overseas. As in the period before the missile base crisis, the effect of Castro's subversive activities will depend not only upon his capabilities but upon the attractiveness of the Cuban example and the willingness of the American governments to take determined counteraction. This willingness will probably be weakened by fulfillment of the US commitment not to invade Cuba.

C. We have examined how Castro's subversive potential would be affected by alternative courses of Soviet policy regarding Cuba: (1) virtual withdrawal of support; (2) continuation of economic and military support ranging from present up to substantially increased levels. We believe that course (1) would considerably reduce Castro's subversive potential, and that the Soviets are unlikely to elect it. We conclude that Soviet course (2) would maintain Castro's potential for subversive action at least at present levels or actually raise it to the point where he could undertake amphibious and/or airborne subversive operations against close-in targets.

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THE ESTIMATE

I. CASTRO'S SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES BEFORE THE MISSILE BASE CRISIS¹

Aims

1. From the time of his accession to power Fidel Castro has sought to gain acceptance of the Cuban revolution as a model for others and of himself as the leader of revolutionary forces throughout Latin America. He has constantly sought to foment revolutions in other Latin American States. Moreover, Castro has generally had the support of the Sino-Soviet Bloc in the pursuit of these aims.

Means

2. Castro began his career of sponsorship for revolutions in Latin America in 1959 with landings of small rebel forces in Nicaragua, Panama, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti. None of these were successful and he turned to other means.

3. From the beginning, propaganda has been one of the principal instruments on which Castro has relied. In addition to the main transmissions of Radio Havana for external listeners, which have had a great deal of revolutionary content, he has beamed special programs devised to stimulate revolutionary action to each of half a dozen selected countries.² A major effort has been made through *Prensa Latina*, the Cuban news service, to disseminate Castro-Communist propaganda. Printed propaganda has also been sent from Cuba into most other Latin American States, and Cuban diplomatic missions and personnel have actively disseminated it. Students returning from indoctrination in Cuba have helped establish Cuban Institutes for Friendship among Peoples which have functioned as propaganda outlets.

4. Thousands of Latin Americans have been brought to Cuba; about 1,200 foreign trainees are believed to be there now. Many hundreds have been trained in revolutionary techniques and guerrilla warfare. Cuba has been made a main transit point for travel between Latin America and the Bloc.

5. Financial support has been provided by Cuba to revolutionary groups in a number of countries, although the cases on which we have reports involved relatively small sums of money. Arms shipments have

¹ See Annex A.

² Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela, Honduras, and the Dominican Republic.

also been reported, but the evidence is unclear as to quantities shipped and the extent of Cuba's role in these transactions. We believe that there is an extensive agent net in Latin America directed from Havana.

6. Castro has associated himself with revolutionary activist groups throughout Latin America. In most cases these have been Communist, but where the regular Communist Party favored a legal or parliamentary line he has not hesitated to support dissident Communist groups, e.g., in Brazil, and non-Communist revolutionaries, e.g., in Guatemala and El Salvador. In some cases he has sponsored new revolutionary organizations, e.g., in Panama, Colombia, and Peru. In Chile he has endorsed a popular front coalition made up of Communist and moderate leftists.

Evaluation

7. Instances of financial and material support sent by Cuba to revolutionaries in other countries which have come to our attention are probably only a part of the total effort. Even so, the effort seems to have been relatively small and ineffective. Yet along with the political and psychological stimulus which Castro's influence has provided, Cuban subversive activities have perceptibly strengthened activist revolutionary groups. Dangerous situations subject to exploitation by Castro and the Communists exist in a number of Latin American countries—notably Venezuela, Brazil, British Guiana, the Dominican Republic, and Bolivia. These dangers arise from political and social tensions which existed long before Castro came to power. They might lie dormant for some time; but with Castro as a potential detonator, they are more likely to blow up. The detonative compound will exist as long as Castroism survives, whatever may happen to Castro personally.

8. The most dangerous aspect of Castroism has been its broad appeal as a symbol of revolutionary change and nationalist assertiveness in Latin America. Propaganda from Cuba has taken advantage of this fact and has almost certainly been a more important influence in the Latin American situation than Castro's other subversive activities. During 1960 and 1961 Castroism became a force to be reckoned with politically in a number of Latin American countries. Certain governments felt obliged to move in the direction of neutralist and leftist positions. This influence waned, however, after Castro identified himself with the Bloc in late 1961. Nevertheless, the appeal to Castro's movement continued to be a source of major concern to almost all governments and seriously restricted their willingness to associate themselves, at least publicly, with the US.

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II. CASTRO'S SUBVERSIVE POTENTIAL IN THE AFTERMATH OF AN AGREEMENT UNDER WHICH THE SOVIETS WOULD WITHDRAW THEIR STRATEGIC MISSILES AND THE US GIVE ASSURANCES THAT IT WOULD NOT INVADE CUBA

9. Castro's subversive capabilities—and his disposition to use them—will be enhanced by the sense of security provided by such sophisticated weapons as are retained in Cuba after the withdrawal of Soviet strategic missiles. The IL-28 bombers, if retained, and other modern equipment noted in Annex B, would be important in this regard. A US commitment not to invade Cuba will further strengthen his sense of immunity from reprisal and almost certainly encourage him to intensify subversive activities in other Latin American countries.

Response of Castro Supporters to Missile Base Crisis

10. Castro's supporters throughout Latin America, with few though important exceptions (e.g., sabotage of oil facilities in Venezuela), failed to respond to the missile base crisis with effective acts of sabotage or with impressive public demonstrations. Two important limiting factors should be taken into account in judging this response, however. US action to alert Latin American governments led them to make extensive advance preparation, including deployment of security forces and the roundup of suspects, a condition of readiness which is unlikely to be maintained indefinitely. There also may have been some uncertainty among the activist followers of Castro whether they should make their big effort in response to the announcement of the US blockade, or wait for the anticipated US invasion. Moscow's apparent failure to provide guidance may have contributed to the confusion. It is our judgment, however, that the response to Castro's appeal for attacks on the US and its friends indicates that his power to command revolutionary action, at least in the circumstances of the missile base crisis, is limited.

Support Which Castro Can Expect in the Future

11. The range of Castro's support has been, we believe, considerably narrowed by events since Castro declared himself a Communist. Revelation of the fact that he had allowed the Soviets to establish offensive bases under exclusive Soviet control has alienated many non-Communist nationalists, genuine neutralists, and even revolutionaries seeking social and economic betterment. San Tiago Dantas, formerly Foreign Minister under President Goulart and an author of Brazil's nonalignment policy, and leading Mexican officials have publicly expressed their disenchantment.

12. The activist revolutionaries are probably the only important force on which Castro can now count, but even their support has apparently been rendered less effective by differences on the question of Soviet relations with Castro and with Latin American Communist parties.

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Castro's Resources for Continued Subversive Activity

13. *Arms.* (See Annex B.) Castro has substantial stocks of arms. In addition to Soviet Bloc materiel there are stores of arms inherited from the Batista regime not being used by Castro forces and available for distribution outside Cuba. In the past he has apparently been hampered in his efforts to use arms for subversive purposes by problems of transport and delivery. He has at his disposal, however, 11 IL-14 transports belonging to Cubana airlines which could be used to deliver arms under certain circumstances. The IL-28's now in Cuba are inappropriate for subversive purposes. However, they could be used for air drops. Cuba has many small craft suitable for infiltration of men and arms. The 6 Khronshtadt subchasers, 16 P-6 motor torpedo boats, and 12 Komar missile boats obtained from the Bloc could also be used for arms deliveries. If the projected trawler base is built up, trawlers—both Cuban and Soviet—could be used for arms deliveries. If Soviet submarines call at the trawler base or at other Cuban ports, they, too, could be used in support of subversive activities. We see no evidence that Cuba has or is developing a sophisticated amphibious warfare capability, and all the means of delivery of arms by sea noted above would be vulnerable to precautionary measures by Latin American military and naval forces.

14. *Propaganda apparatus.* Castro's propaganda machine remains intact. For the time being, however, his diplomatic missions are likely to find it harder to disseminate propaganda than in the past, both because of new precautions by local governments and because of a reduction in the numbers of cooperative volunteers outside the organized Communist groups.

15. *Money and equipment.* Despite differences between Castro and the USSR concerning dismantling of the missile bases, we believe that the Soviets will continue to supply Castro with money, supplies, and equipment for subversive activity. The Soviets have certainly supplied Castro with sophisticated instruments of intelligence collection, sabotage, and clandestine communications.

16. *Organization.* The organization of Castro's subversive assets throughout Latin America was shown by the recent crisis to be loose and otherwise faulty. We estimate that Castro will make a strong effort to strengthen and improve it, and that he will continue to receive support in this effort from the Soviet apparatus, both in Cuba itself, where the Soviet Ambassador is a veteran officer of the KGB, and in other important centers of Soviet activity such as Mexico City and Montevideo.

Other Factors on Which Castro's Subversive Capability Will Depend

17. If the US and USSR reach and implement the agreement stated in the problem Castro will gain an immunity which he lacked before the missile base crisis. He will, furthermore, still have most of the arms and equipment which were delivered in the post-July buildup, as well as enhanced capabilities provided by accelerated training. Presumably his enemies will have about the same, or less, freedom to engage in propaganda, sabotage, support for resistance activities, and other actions designed to overthrow Castro than they had before the crisis—almost certainly not more. Unless Castro is gravely endangered by internal political and economic problems, there is no reason to believe that anti-Castro activities are any more likely to jeopardize his position than they did before the crisis.

18. *Situation in Cuba.* Castro's ability to engage in subversive activities will be influenced significantly by the strength and stability of his position at home. Heightened political and economic difficulties in Cuba would restrict Castro's subversive effort, while the more secure he is at home, the more freedom and strength he is likely to have for subverting other governments and re-establishing his prestige and influence. Castro's position in Cuba will depend in part on his own policies, but is likely to depend even more upon those of the Soviets.

19. *Alternative Soviet policies.* There are several courses of action with respect to Cuba which the Soviets are likely to consider. Some leaders may argue that the whole policy of economic and military support for Castro should be abandoned along with the plan for the deployment of strategic missiles in Cuba. We believe, however, that the Soviet stake in Cuba as an ally and as a Soviet center in Latin America is still too high to abandon. The stake in Castro as a person, however, is questionable. If the Soviets did make a decision to withdraw support either from Castro or from Cuba, we believe that Cuban capability for subversion in Latin America would be greatly reduced, at least for a time. This capability would be reduced more in the case of the Soviets' withdrawing support from Cuba than in the case of their abandonment of Castro alone.

20. An alternative course would be for the Soviets to continue to extend economic and military assistance. Such assistance could range all the way from the amounts necessary to maintain Cuba in its present condition, including support of the expanded military establishment, to substantial increases. Such a policy would probably reduce considerably Castro's internal problems and thus give him additional freedom to engage in external subversion and sabotage. Additions to Castro's stocks of small arms would not in themselves change his capability for subversive activity, as he already has supplies of surplus arms. However, if the Soviets were to provide substantial additional air and

sealift capability, the Cubans would be able to mount large-scale subversive interventions in neighboring countries. Furthermore, whatever degree of success is achieved in improving Cuba's position and in expanding its physical resources, Cuba's net capability for subversion and sabotage will in the last analysis largely be determined by the overall situation in Latin America.

21. We do not believe that Castro or the Soviets can yet foresee what the effects of the recent crisis will be over the long term on their relationship. The crisis has probably created difficulties of a political and psychological nature that neither of them can readily solve, however determined they may be to do so. Castro may have been moved by the treatment he has received at the hands of the Soviets to consider modifying his relationship with them and seeking to improve his relations with the OAS and possibly even the US. We believe, however, that he is unlikely to find feasible ways of reducing his dependence upon the USSR. The Soviets certainly must consider that they have effective means of exercising control over Castro. Furthermore, his repeated assertions of continued loyalty to Marxism-Leninism make it unlikely that he is seriously contemplating a restoration of relations with the OAS, or that he could succeed if he tried.

22. *Policy of other American nations.* Castro's subversive capabilities will be greatly influenced by the policies and actions of other Latin American nations, as by those of the US. We believe that the high state of security alert that has prevailed since 22 October and the show of unity that marked the recent crisis are unlikely to last. There is sure to be a revival of nationalist sentiments. On balance, however, we believe that the prospects for countersubversive action by Latin American States, on their own and in conjunction with the US, are improved. Many responsible Latin Americans will have interpreted recent events to mean that firm and united action can be effective against the Soviet threat from Cuba. However, Latin American governments will probably be less willing to take coordinated action against Communist inroads if the US commits itself not to invade Cuba.

Likely Future Targets for Cuban Sabotage

23. The extent of Castro's capabilities for sabotage and other clandestine activity in Latin America will depend upon the complicated factors noted above. Whatever his capabilities are, he will not be at a loss for targets against which to use them. Some of the more obvious targets are:

a. *US missions and personnel.* US missions and personnel all over Latin America were designated as targets for attack in the various calls for action which went out during the recent crisis. Action against

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such targets has a primarily political and propaganda value to Castro in that it tends to show public opposition to US policy. It is also relatively easy for Castro to promote attacks against official US installations in a crisis situation and to get help from all the various elements which are opposed to American influence in the area. Future attacks may be anticipated in situations in which Castro feels that the public resentment of US policy exists or can be stirred up.

b. *Physical targets vulnerable to a limited sabotage effort.* Prime targets for sabotage will be mining, industrial, and business installations in which there is a large proportion of US capital, which are otherwise associated with the US, or which are so important to the local economy that damage to them would create difficulties for governments which are anti-Castro and cooperating with the US. Oil facilities in Venezuela, including the oil and water pipelines to the refineries on the Paraguana Peninsula, and similar facilities are likely to be chosen as targets for Cuban sabotage. Installations for the handling of Venezuelan iron ore are also likely objectives. US installations in Panama might be attacked.

c. Port and communications facilities are generally vulnerable to sabotage and are appealing targets to Cubans and other Latin American Communists particularly in countries which are cooperating with the US and whose communications media are taking an anti-Castro line. Telephone, telegraph, radio and television facilities, and most public utilities, particularly electric power and transformer stations, are potential targets. Selection of targets for sabotage will depend on the importance of particular facilities but even more on the varying access of Castroites and Communists to them.

d. *Political targets susceptible to exploitation.* Political instability throughout Latin America, in almost every case characterized by pressures from below upon relatively conservative and generally anti-Communist governments, provide Castro with opportunities for subversive political activity. Particularly unstable situations include the following:

- (1) *Venezuela*, where Communist-inspired disorders have been kept in check by the government, but where continued Communist and leftist violence may lead the military to take control. In a country such as Venezuela, where the stability of an anti-Castro and anti-Communist government depends heavily upon one man, assassination is another danger.
- (2) *Nicaragua*, where Communist-led groups, in anticipation of coming elections, may seek to incite or exploit violence against the Somoza regime.
- (3) *Guatemala*, where President Ydigoras' position is weak and uncertain.

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- (4) *The Dominican Republic*, where the problems of political reconstruction after a generation of dictatorship have proved almost more than the caretaker government can handle, and where some political groupings amenable to Castro's influence are seeking to gain a footing.
- (5) *Bolivia*, where the struggle for dominance within the ruling MNR Party between the moderates and those on the far left is ready-made for exploitation by Castro.
- (6) *Brazil*, where Communists have penetrated the government and military to some limited extent, the tide of nationalist and anti-US feeling is strong, and depressed socio-economic conditions and inefficient government administration provide Castro many opportunities, especially in the northeast.

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ANNEX A

HIGHLIGHTS OF CUBAN SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES IN OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES TO DATE

1. Cuban subversive activities of one sort or another have been directed toward virtually every other Latin American State. Cuban Embassies have been without exception centers for propaganda and efforts to cultivate receptive local groups, whether they be Castroite, regular Communist, leftist, or simply disgruntled with the existing regime.³ The Cuban Embassy is commonly a disbursing of funds for subversive purposes. Radio propaganda from Havana has been and is being beamed at each of the Latin American States, sometimes tailored to have particular local impact. Sympathetic nationals from the other Latin American States have been encouraged and given financial support to come to Cuba for varying lengths of time for training, goodwill visits, or for purposes of instruction and coordination of subversive programs.

2. The above represents a general pattern. There are, of course, significant variations and different degrees of effort, depending on how Castro's regime views the importance and vulnerability of the target country. The following represents a summary, country by country, of the most typical reports of Cuban subversive activity available to us. (See paragraphs 7-8 of subject memorandum for evaluation of Castro's subversive activities to date.)

A. Argentina

- (1) A "Cuban-Argentine Friendship Institute" exists for recruiting and sending Argentine citizens to Cuba. Some 150 have been sent by way of Uruguay and Mexico for training in guerrilla warfare.
- (2) There is continued Cuban contact with Argentine Peronist-Communist groups.
- (3) In July 1962, police in Buenos Aires discovered a quantity of explosives and propaganda which were subsequently linked to Cuban Communists and Peronist activists.

B. Bolivia

- (1) Between 130 and 150 Bolivians will receive "scholarships" in Cuba during 1962.

³ Only five countries still have Cuban Embassies: Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Uruguay.

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- (2) The Cuban Embassy has attempted to incite extreme leftist members of the governing MNR Party to leave the party, and presumably assists the Bolivian Communist Party in its program to penetrate the peasant and labor militia units.
- (3) The Cuban Embassy has cultivated relations with the Bolivian *campesino*, and given financial assistance to the peasant union in the Cliza Valley of Bolivia.

C. Brazil

- (1) Castro has close ties with Francisco Juliao, self-proclaimed Marxist and leader of the Peasant Leagues in northeast Brazil. Juliao has traveled to Cuba several times; his wife and children live in Cuba; a number of his associates and rank and file League members have gone to Cuba for "agricultural" training; and Brazilian Communist leaders have stated that Juliao's Leagues have received arms and money from Cuba.
- (2) Castro supports and has personally encouraged the insurrectionary policy of the dissident Communist Party of Brazil (CPB), which split from the regular Brazilian Communist Party (PCB), in 1961 with a membership of about 1,000.

D. British Guiana

- (1) The Castro regime has been hospitable to the leadership of the dominant People's Progressive Party (PPP) in Guiana, and Premier Cheddi Jagan, his wife, and other members of the PPP have traveled to Cuba and made enthusiastic comments about the Castro regime.
- (2) Cuba has provided the PPP with a printing press, the people to install it, and possibly some small arms.
- (3) As many as 60 Guianans may be in Cuba on scholarship and receiving military training there.
- (4) Cuba last June wanted to set up a permanent trade commission office in British Guiana; the UK was willing to let a Cuban trade group visit but not establish a permanent office and finally refused the Cubans visas.

E. Chile

- (1) Senator Salvador Allende, leader of Chile's Communist-dominated Popular Front and a leading presidential aspirant, has made at least two trips to Cuba. He has been an outspoken defender of Castro.

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- (2) In March of 1962, Cuban Minister of Education Armando Hart went to Chile for an international conference and took with him several sacks of propaganda. In early October 1962 the Cubans were caught smuggling propaganda material into Chile.
- (3) A number of students from Chile have undergone Communist indoctrination in Cuba.
- (4) The Chilean pro-Communist labor confederation, CUTCH, has tried, along with Cubans, to promote a Communist-dominated Latin American Labor Federation.

F. Colombia

- (1) Castro's principal instrument is the United Front for Revolutionary Action (FUAR), organized by pro-Castro extremists in early 1962 to create a guerrilla movement aimed at overthrowing the present government.
- (2) Castro reportedly gave the FUAR \$15,000 last June and promised more financial aid on a semiannual basis.
- (3) The FUAR has recruited members from the Revolutionary Liberal Movement, the Worker-Student-Peasant Movement, and the Colombian Communist Party's extremist wing which is dissatisfied with the party's reluctance to engage in armed revolutions.
- (4) The FUAR is also making efforts to penetrate the many armed bandit groups that have operated in rural areas of central and western Colombia since 1948 and to coordinate these groups into a unified insurgency movement.

G. Costa Rica

The small Communist "Popular Vanguard Party" (PVP) has sent several members to Cuba for training, and there are plans to organize guerrilla training programs in Costa Rica under the direction of these members.

H. The Dominican Republic

- (1) Under its provisional Council of State the Dominican Republic has been a major target for Cuban subversion, and regular radio broadcasts to the Dominican Republic from Cuba have helped incite the frequent riots in Santo Domingo.
- (2) A cadre of Dominican Communists is headquartered in Cuba.
- (3) The Communist-dominated 14th of June Party (PCJ) has plans for executing guerrilla warfare in the event of government persecution, has reportedly stored away arms for such use, and expects Cuban material and financial support in any such effort.

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- (4) A government roundup during the Cuban crisis of pro-Castro political leaders turned up a cache of arms, propaganda, materials, and radio equipment.

I. Ecuador

- (1) Castro has assets both in the Communist Party of Ecuador (PCE) and in the Revolutionary Union of Ecuadorean Youth (URJE).
- (2) The nucleus of a guerrilla organization was begun last summer by dissident PCE elements drawing on members of the URJE. Representatives of both groups have received guerrilla training in Cuba, and are stockpiling arms in rural areas. The URJE has probably gotten some Cuban financial support and may have received arms from Cuba.
- (3) Manuel Araujo Hidalgo, a pro-Communist former Ecuadorean Minister of Interior, who has recently visited Cuba, China, and the USSR reportedly has received a considerable amount of money from the Cuban Government for his work with the URJE.
- (4) Ecuador has received substantial quantities of Communist propaganda.

J. El Salvador

On 1 March 1961, the Salvadoran Government broke relations with the Castro regime after receiving evidence that the Cuban chargé was urging increased revolutionary activity on the part of Salvadoran Communists.

K. Guatemala

- (1) Castro has given financial support, training, and propaganda assistance to the Communist-influenced "13 November" Group, which launched sporadic guerrilla fighting early this year (some 40-60 active fighting men and several hundred collaborators).
- (2) Castro was also in touch early this year with leaders of the orthodox Guatemalan Communist Party urging them to take a more militant revolutionary role similar to the "13 November" Group.
(Leaders of both groups are normally in exile in Mexico.)

L. Haiti

A cadre of Haitian Communists is resident in Cuba, and many thousands of Haitian citizens living in eastern Cuba are being subjected to Communist regimentation and indoctrination.

M. Honduras

- (1) Prior to the break in Cuban-Honduran diplomatic relations in April 1961, Cuban personnel under the cover of consular and diplomatic offices were active in the north coast region of Honduras.
- (2) Many Hondurans are in Cuba under the "scholarship" program.
- (3) Honduras now is the target of a particularly vicious regular radio program beamed especially to Honduras by Radio Havana.

N. Jamaica

- (1) The limited Cuban subversive efforts of which we have knowledge are directed through the "Peoples Freedom Movement" (the *de facto* Communist Party), the Cuban Consulate, and a "Friends of Cuba Committee."
- (2) Some 25,000-40,000 Jamaicans are currently living in Cuba, and considerable travel between Cuba and the rest of Latin America goes through Jamaica.

O. Mexico

- (1) Mexico is the most important outside base for Cuban propaganda and subversive operations into the rest of Latin America.
- (2) The Cuban Embassy in conjunction with the large Soviet Embassy, the Cuban Consulate in Merida, and the "Cuban-Mexican Cultural Center" in Merida have been particularly active in support of the Communist-influenced National Liberation Movement (MLN).
- (3) Cuban Embassy officials helped to incite the anti-US demonstrations by Mexican students in July and August 1960.

P. Nicaragua

- (1) A cadre of Nicaraguan Communists is based in Cuba, and it has sporadic contact with pro-Castro elements in Nicaragua and in exile in other Caribbean countries.
- (2) A number of Nicaraguans have received guerrilla training in Cuba, and have later been among the small guerrilla bands that have infiltrated Nicaragua from Honduras.

Q. Panama

Cuban financial assistance is believed to be channeled to the pro-Communist National Action Vanguard (VAN) in Panama, a revolutionary group of Marxists active among the peasants; one

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of the VAN leaders frequently travels to Cuba and claims to be a personal friend of Fidel Castro.

R. Paraguay

- (1) Cuban efforts with regard to Paraguay take the form of financial support and direction to exiled opposition groups, notably in Uruguay and Argentina.
- (2) The principal recipient of such aid is the United Front for National Liberation (FULNA), some of whose leaders are in Uruguay or Argentina, and whose rank and file (2,500-5,000) is mostly in Argentina. (FULNA members in Argentina also receive arms and supplies from Brazilian Communists.)
- (3) FULNA has persistently sought to penetrate and direct other exile activities, and has been implicated in or responsible for several invasion attempts since 1959.

S. Peru

- (1) In June 1962 at least eight Peruvians traveled to Cuba via Mexico to receive training and indoctrination, and other Peruvian Communists or pro-Communists have long resided in Cuba.
- (2) Although still in the organizational stage, pro-Communist guerrillas and other leftist extremist groups have been operating intermittently in Peru for many months, and the Peruvian Communist Party is intensifying efforts to organize scattered extremist groups and Indians into a subversive movement, including incitement to invade private property in central and southern Peru.

T. Trinidad

The local Communist-front party has been more active since the May visit of a Cuban representative from Jamaica.

U. Uruguay

- (1) Uruguay is the next most important center of operations after Mexico for both Castro and the Soviets.
- (2) The activities of the Cuban Embassy in Montevideo in promoting pro-Castro propaganda led the Uruguayan Government in January 1961 to declare the Cuban Ambassador persona non grata for interference in internal Uruguayan affairs.

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V. Venezuela

- (1) The Castro regime has been particularly vitriolic in its propaganda attacks on the Betancourt government.
- (2) There is in Venezuela the most active and best supported Communist guerrilla movement in Latin America, apparently directed by the Venezuelan Communist Party with the aid of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR).
- (3) Pro-Castro elements were probably involved in recent violence, during the Cuban crisis, which resulted in the blowing up of US-owned oil facilities in Venezuela.

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ANNEX B

ESTIMATED MILITARY EQUIPMENT IN CUBA AFTER WITHDRAWAL OF STRATEGIC MISSILES ^a

	AS OF 1 AUGUST	DELIVERED SINCE 1 AUGUST ^b	AS OF 9 NOVEMBER
ARMOR			
<i>Bloc</i>			
Medium tanks (T-54/100mm and T-34/85mm)	130	175	305 (about 1/3 are T-54/100mm)
Heavy tanks (JS-2/122mm)	30	10	40
Amphibious tanks (PT-76)	0	some	some
Assault guns (SU-100)	50	25	75
Armored personnel carrier (BTR-152)	25	15	40
Armored personnel carrier (BTR-50P)	0	40	40
Armored personnel carrier (8 wheel)	0	28	28
Amphibious armored scout car BRDM	0	13	13
<i>Non-Bloc</i>			
Light tank, M-3A1 (US)	12	0	12
Medium tank, M-4A1, with 76mm gun (US)	12	0	12
Medium tank, Comet with 77mm gun (UK)	15	0	15
Scout car, M-3A1, white (US)	19	0	19
Light armored car, M-8 (US)	20	0	20
ARTILLERY			
<i>Bloc</i>			
Quad 14.5mm ZPU	50	50	100
76mm field gun M-1942	150	50	200
85mm field gun D-44	110	190	300
122mm How. M-1938	75	45	120
122mm gun M-1931/1937	60	60	120
57mm AT gun M-1943	270	30	300
Quad 12.7mm AA MG	350	0	350

^a The inventory of non-Bloc equipment does not reflect any attrition which may have occurred as a result of normal usage or a lack of spare parts.

^b Cost of military equipment in Cuba received from the Sino-Soviet Bloc since 1 August 1962: We estimate that the total value of these military shipments since 1 August, including the other equipment, spare parts, and ammunition usually associated with these weapons, would exceed \$550 million, of which about \$50 to \$60 million would be related to the IL-28's. These estimates do not include the cost of the services of Soviet "technicians."

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	AS OF DELIVERED SINCE		AS OF
	1 AUGUST	1 AUGUST	9 NOVEMBER
ARTILLERY (Continued)			
<i>Bloc (Continued)</i>			
Twin 30mm AAA gun M-1953	60	60	120
37mm AAA gun, M-1939	90	30	120
57mm AAA gun	60	60	120
152mm gun-How. M-1937	55	125	180
FROG (ArtyKton PT-76 chassis)	0	4	4
<i>Non-Bloc</i>			
75mm Pack How. (US)	8	0	8
105mm How. (IT)	4	0	4
37mm gun, M-6 (US)	9	0	9
25mm Hotchkiss AA gun (FR)	16	0	16
MORTARS			
<i>Bloc</i>			
82mm	600	0	600
122mm	180	0	180
160mm	0	some	some
<i>Non-Bloc</i>			
60mm (US)	39	0	39
81mm (US, IT)	106	0	106
4.2-in (US)	7	0	7
INFANTRY ROCKET LAUNCHERS			
<i>Bloc</i>			
RPG-2 AT	1,000	0	1,000
RM-130	24	26	50
RM-132	12	13	25
<i>Non-Bloc</i>			
3.5-in rocket launcher (US, IT)	145	0	145
57mm recoilless rifle, M-18 (US)	27	0	27
SMALL ARMS			300,000
(Most were manufactured in Belgium, some in the US, and a few in the Bloc.)			
MOTORIZED TRANSPORT			
<i>Bloc</i>			
1/4 to 10 ton trucks	3,800	4,000-6,000	7,500-10,000
Tracked amphibian K-61	0	30	30
<i>Non-Bloc</i>			
1/4 ton truck (US) ^c	1,300	0	1,300
Trucks, misc. (US)	160	0	160
Sedans (US)	175	0	175
MISSILES			
<i>Bloc</i>			
SA-2 Guideline			
Sites	0	24	24
Launchers	0	144	144
Est. missiles	possibly a few	500	500

^c An unknown number of this total are Bloc trucks.

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	AS OF 1 AUGUST	DELIVERED SINCE 1 AUGUST	AS OF 9 NOVEMBER
MISSILES (Continued)			
<i>Bloc (Continued)</i>			
Coastal defense cruise (35 n.m.)			
Sites	0	4-5	4-5
Launchers	0	8-10	8-10
Est. missiles	0	40	40
<i>Non-Bloc</i>			
None			
RADARS			
<i>Bloc</i>			
TOKEN	0	15	15
KNIFE REST	0	15-20	15-20
SPOON REST	0	30-40	30-40
FRUIT SET	0	24	24
FIRE CAN	0	20	20
BAR LOCK	0	15	15
FLAT FACE	0	15	15
WHIFF	0	unknown	unknown
ROCK CAKE	0	unknown	unknown
<i>Non-Bloc</i>			
None			
HELICOPTERS			
<i>Bloc</i>			
MI-4 (Hound) MI-1 (Hare)	24	about 45	about 70
<i>Non-Bloc</i>			
H-19 (US)	1	0	1
H-13 (US)	9	0	9
VH-12 (US)	2	0	2
JET FIGHTERS			
<i>Bloc</i>			
MIG-15/17	35	15	50
MIG-19	0	12	12
MIG-21	0	39	39
<i>Non-Bloc</i>			
T-33, trainer (US) ⁴	4	0	4
JET LIGHT BOMBERS			
<i>Bloc</i>			
IL-28 ⁵	0	42	42
<i>Non-Bloc</i>			
None			
OTHER PROPELLER AIRCRAFT			
<i>Bloc</i>			
IL-14, transport, (USSR)	14-16	0	14-16
LI-2, transport, (USSR)	0	4	4

⁴ Have been used as fighters.

⁵ At San Julian Airfield: IL-28s, 24 in crates, 5 completely assembled, 2 partially assembled (fuselages and tails assembled), 2 UIL-28s (the trainer model) completely assembled.

At Holquin Airfield: IL-28s, 9 created.

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	AS OF 1 AUGUST	DELIVERED SINCE 1 AUGUST	AS OF 9 NOVEMBER
OTHER PROPELLER AIRCRAFT (Con.)			
<i>Non-Bloc</i> [†]			
F-51, fighter (US)	1	0	1
F-47, fighter-bomber (US)	3	0	3
Sea Fury MK-1, fighter-bomber (UK)	10	0	10
B-26, lt/tac/attack/bmr (US)	17	0	17
TBM-3s, carrier type torpedo— Plume, WW-II (US)	5	0	5
C-82, transport (US)	1	0	1
C-47, transport (US)	7	0	7
C-46, transport (US)	4	0	4
C-54, transport (US)	2	0	2
Lockheed Lodestars, transport (US)	1	0	1
T-6, trainer (US)	6	0	6
N2S, trainer (US)	6	0	6
NAVAL SHIPS			
<i>Bloc</i>			
Subchasers (Khronshtadt)	6	0	6
Motor torpedo boats	12	4	16
KOMAR cruise-missile boats (2 missiles per boat)	0	12	12
Patrol and service craft	0	several	several
<i>Non-Bloc</i>			
PF (patrol escort) (US)	5	0	5
PGM (motor gunboat) (US)	1	0	1
Misc. patrol and servicecraft *	42	0	42

[†]This inventory does not include over 50 light aircraft reportedly confiscated from private owners.

*Total may be greater as a number of fishing boats and pleasure craft have been armed for patrol use.

NOTE: The sudden increase in military equipment deliveries began in late July. We are unable to determine, however, whether our estimate of the amount of Bloc equipment in Cuba as of 1 August is significantly lower than it should be. If so, this may be low in the category of land armaments. We feel fairly sure that the great bulk of the most sophisticated weapons did arrive after 1 August. A possible exception is that some SA-2 missiles and associated equipment arrived in the last week of July. Some 150 Bloc ships have arrived in Cuban ports since 1 August. Of these over 120 are believed to have carried arms and military-related equipment. The full breakdown of these cargoes by type of arms is not known, and the types and quantity of arms which the other ships may have carried is not known. The estimate of Bloc arms currently in Cuba is based partly on solid evidence of the presence of known quantities of some types of arms and partly on estimated requirements for T/O&E in other categories.