

USAF PLANS AND POLICIES
IN
SOUTH VIETNAM AND LAOS
1964

USAF HISTORICAL DIVISION
LIAISON OFFICE

LAO: 


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FOREWORD

This study emphasizes Headquarters USAF's plans and policies with respect to South Vietnam and Laos in 1964. In the first four chapters the author describes the progressive military and political decline of the Saigon regime, after two government coups, and the efforts by U.S. authorities to cope with this problem. He notes especially the view of the Air Force Chief of Staff, Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, frequently stated, that only air strikes on North Vietnam could end the insurgencies in South Vietnam and in Laos and bring stability to the Vietnamese government. This contrasted with administration efforts to devise an effective pacification program and, pending emergence of a stable government, its decision to adopt a "low risk" policy to avoid military escalation.

In the remaining chapters of the study, the author discusses briefly the major USAF augmentations, the expansion of the Vietnamese Air Force, the problem of service representation in Headquarters, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, and the rules of engagement as they affected particularly air combat training. The study concludes with a brief review of the beginning of USAF special air warfare training for the Royal Laotian Air Force and the inauguration of limited USAF and Navy air operations over Laos to contain Communist expansion in that country.

USAF Plans and Policies in South Vietnam and Laos in 1964 is a sequel to three earlier studies prepared by the USAF Historical Division Liaison Office on counterinsurgency and Air Force activities in Southeast Asia. The earlier studies are: USAF Plans and Policies in South Vietnam, 1961-1963; USAF Counterinsurgency Doctrines and Capabilities, 1961-1962; and USAF Special Air Warfare Doctrine and Capabilities, 1963.


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I. REVISED U.S.-SOUTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY PLANNING

(TS) At the beginning of 1964 the South Vietnamese government, now headed by Maj. Gen. Duong Van Minh, had not recovered from the overthrow of former President Ngo Dien Diem on 1 November 1963. The breakdown in authority enabled the Viet Cong (Vietnamese Communists) to overrun many strategic hamlets and military outposts and achieve other successes. Buoyed by victories, improved organization, and increasing North Vietnamese and other Communist bloc aid, their momentum continued into the new year. U.S. estimates placed hard-core Viet Cong strength at 22,000 to 25,000, and irregular forces at 60,000 to 80,000. Compared with January 1963 estimates, hard-core cadres had increased modestly and irregular forces had declined slightly despite losses of about 1,000 monthly from deaths, wounds, capture, and defec-¹tions.

(S) Despite setbacks, South Vietnamese forces engaged the Viet Cong in scores of actions, mostly in the southern part of the country. In the first five weeks of 1964 they averaged 56 battalion-size or larger operations per week, but smaller actions, while less frequent, were more effective, accounting for one half of reported enemy killed. Ground action was accompanied by a rising level of air support by USAF's 1st Air Commando Squadron (previously Farmgate) and the

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Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF). Summarizing the military situation for the JCS, Adm. Harry D. Felt, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC) and Gen. Paul D. Harkins, Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMAC/V) said that the most suitable Vietnamese tactics required good intelligence, communication security, and large and small actions to "clear and hold" former enemy territory.²

(TS) After the fall of Diem, top U.S. military and diplomatic officials reviewed their Vietnam planning. Headquarters MAC/V prepared a new pacification plan to replace the poorly executed and moribund national campaign plan of 1963. The U.S. Ambassador in Saigon, Henry Cabot Lodge, advocated a broader civic action program as he perceived a Viet Cong shift from military to political tactics. Lodge stressed the need for trained political teams to acquaint the rural populace with the Saigon government's objectives in education, land reform, health, and other areas. He urged a beginning in Long An Province where Viet Cong control was virtually complete.³

(TS) The JCS pressed for stronger measures. On 22 January it recommended to Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara that the United States should deploy more forces, assume temporary tactical control of the war, and make MAC/V responsible for the entire U.S. effort in South Vietnam. It favored air and ground actions to halt the flow of personnel and supplies from Laos and Cambodia, and air and sea strikes against North Vietnam.⁴

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(TS) McNamara expressed special interest in employing more reconnaissance to detect Communist infiltration. In response to a query, Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, USAF Chief of Staff, prepared a list of Air Force and VNAF aircraft in the theater available for this purpose and said that more were scheduled to arrive. One decision reached was to begin high altitude U-2 flights in February over North and South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.⁵

General Khanh's Coup

(U) Meanwhile, a power struggle within the Minh government led, on 6 January 1964, to the establishment of a military triumvirate. Twenty-four days later Maj. Gen. Nguyen Khanh, Commander of the Vietnamese Army's I Corps, organized a bloodless coup d'etat against the triumvirate. Khanh emerged as Chairman of the Military Revolutionary Council and, on 8 February, took over as Premier of the country with General Minh elected to the ceremonial post of head of state. In justifying his actions, Khanh charged that the three-month old Minh regime had failed to make progress in effecting political, social, and economic reforms and was susceptible to the influence of a neutralist officer faction. He also accused President Charles De Gaulle, of France, of attempting to interfere in Vietnamese affairs.⁶

(S) In his coup, Khanh enjoyed the strong support of Col. Nguyen Cao Ky,* Commander of the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) since 16 December 1963. U.S. officials subsequently expressed hope that the new government

* On 5 March 1964 Colonel Ky was promoted to Brigadier General.

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would, as it promised, step up operations against the Viet Cong. On 17 February McNamara told a House committee that the Khanh government appeared to have considerably more popular support than its predecessor and was pursuing more effective strategic hamlet and "clear and hold" programs. The Defense Secretary reaffirmed plans to withdraw most U.S. troops by the end of 1965.⁷

(TS) To improve U.S. assistance to the new government, President Johnson established an interdepartmental committee* to manage U.S. policy and operations in South Vietnam, ordered the prompt fulfillment of all aid requests from Ambassador Lodge, asked that U.S. dependents be encouraged to return voluntarily, and directed a speed-up in shaping a "credible deterrent" against North Vietnam. The President also announced that McNamara would again visit Saigon to review the military situation there.⁸

Plans to Revitalize Counterinsurgency Operations

(S) As a result of Premier Khanh's promising leadership, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, asked the JCS for a new plan to revitalize counterinsurgency and recommendations to stabilize the government and prevent new coups.⁹

(TS) The JCS quickly recommended stepped up intelligence and operations in border areas, financial relief for areas taxed by both the government and the Viet Cong, more U.S. military and civilian

* Known as the Sullivan Committee, it was headed by William H. Sullivan, Assistant to Undersecretary for Political Affairs, W. Averill Harriman.

advisors at all government levels, better civilian programs to gain popular support, more effective crop destruction in Viet Cong areas, and increased effort to win the support of U.S. news media. It studied the possibility of combining the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam (MAAG/V) with MAC/V,* endorsed the latest Vietnamese national pacification plan, and urged the preparation of a civilian plan wherein new "Life Hamlets" would replace strategic hamlets. The JCS cautioned that only Vietnamese civilian administrators, in the long run, could stabilize an area cleared by military forces.¹⁰

(S) The new national pacification plan was scheduled to begin on 3 February but the Khanh coup caused a delay. After he approved it on the 17th, government ministers changed the name to the Chien Thang or "victory" national pacification plan. Based on a "spreading oil drop" concept, it consisted of two phases. First, military operations would destroy or expel the Viet Cong. Secondly, the Viet Cong "infrastructure" or cells would be liquidated and replaced by new and "friendly" organizations. There would be expanded civic action programs designed to improve police, education, health, welfare, economic, and other activities to win the confidence of the people. A national pacification council, headed by Premier Khanh, was created to oversee the plan.¹¹

(S) An air plan subsequently prepared by the Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) to aid pacification called for enlarged and better coordinated close support and interdiction programs with more aircraft placed on continuous alert to provide faster reaction. As the "oil drop" spread and liberated areas widened, pockets of Viet Cong would be rooted out by heavier day and night

* See p 16.

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air attacks. Because of VNAF limitations, more USAF aircraft and personnel would be needed for combat training strikes and to provide reconnaissance for aiding border control. PACAF believed that the expanded use of airpower was essential to weaken enemy morale, increase his casualties and defections, win support of fence-sitting Vietnamese, and demonstrate Vietnamese and U.S. determination.¹²

(TS) The JCS endorsed Ambassador Lodge's proposal (supported by the State Department) to recapture Long An Province from the Viet Cong. The Air Force especially believed that air support would be vital to the operation. Secretary of the Air Force Eugene M. Zuckert informed McNamara that USAF and VNAF units could transport medical and other supplies, and provide aerial loudspeakers for broadcasting to the Vietnamese. Political teams, if attacked, could quickly radio for air support and airborne troops.¹³

(S) Some U.S. officials considered the Lodge plan impractical. The U.S. Minister-Counselor in Saigon (and sometimes Acting Ambassador), David G. Nes, thought that the JCS directive to implement the plan revealed "an almost total lack of comprehension" of the Vietnam problem. General Harkins and Admiral Felt agreed that an immediate offensive in Long An Province was not possible. Harkins pointed to inadequate Vietnamese civic action planning, conflicting provincial military priorities, and a "bizarre" command structure that permitted pacification troops to be transferred. As a consequence, Ambassador Lodge's proposal was soon abandoned.¹⁴

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(TS) Although the Air Force Chief of Staff concurred with JCS proposals to revitalize the counterinsurgency program, he urged still bolder U.S. measures. A 12 February intelligence report, General LeMay observed, warned that without a marked improvement in efficiency, the Vietnamese government and armed forces "at best had an even chance" of withstanding the Viet Cong in the coming weeks and months. Regardless of the threat of escalation, LeMay thought that the time for a military showdown had arrived, and that the U.S. government should explain to the American people the extent of Communist subversion in South Vietnam and announce its determination to defeat it.¹⁵

Plans to Increase Pressure on North Vietnam

(S) With its hopes raised by the seemingly strong Khanh government, the administration was not ready to follow LeMay's counsel. However, on 21 February, McNamara asked the JCS to assess ways to apply more pressure on North Vietnam to persuade it to end support of the insurgents in the South and in Laos. They were to include actions such as special air and sea nonnuclear attacks which would be least likely to escalate the conflict and cause adverse third country reaction. In addition, he asked them to suggest how best to deter Hanoi and Peking from dispatching troops throughout Southeast Asia.¹⁶

(TS) In a partial reply on 2 March the JCS recommended selected air attacks immediately on North Vietnam for "shock" effect as part of a coordinated diplomatic, psychological, and military program. These attacks could be followed by additional air and amphibious attacks,

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sabotage, and harrassment of the North's fishing and shipping in ascending severity.* For the air and sea assault program, VNAF's effort could be augmented by 1st Air Commando Squadron and B-57 aircraft. Additionally, there should be preparations for armed reconnaissance of military supply lines between North Vietnam and Laos and China, air strikes of industrial targets in the Hanoi-Haiphong area, mining of waters, and a maritime blockade of the North. The Joint Chiefs also foresaw the need for limited Vietnamese incursions, with U.S. support, into Laos and Cambodia to reduce Viet Cong infiltration from and escape into these sanctuaries. They prepared a special memorandum for McNamara on this subject.¹⁷

(TS) The JCS considered it unlikely that the proposed graduated attacks would result in any large-scale Chinese intervention. In the dry season, it thought, the Chinese could support logistically 13 infantry divisions, less artillery and armor, and North Vietnam 9 divisions. Estimated air strength in South China, Hainan Island, and North Vietnam was placed at 400 jet fighters and 125 light bombers. Chinese sea power was limited. Although China could order land, sea, and air attacks simultaneously against South Korea, Taiwan, and other areas, it could not sustain a major assault in more than one region at a time.¹⁸

(TS) McNamara's 21 February request also prompted the JCS to ask ✓ CINCPAC to prepare an air and naval plan against North Vietnam and China.

* Some of these activities would be under the aegis of special Plan 34 that provided for limited operations such as mining of waters, bombardment of selected installations, sabotage, radio broadcasts, and leaflet drops.

Previously, the Air Force excepted, the services had opposed the concept behind such a plan: the Army and Marine Corps because it was "unthinkable" not to provide for sizeable ground forces; the Navy because of concern lest an Air Force commander exercise control over Navy air. In response, CINCPAC on 1 June issued Operational Plan 38-64. The JCS approved it in July. While basically concerned with air and naval actions, Plan 38-64 also required the use of sizeable ground forces.¹⁹

New U.S. Policy Guidance

(U) Meanwhile, Washington's review of the U.S. role in South Vietnam and the possibility of air strikes on the North received much publicity. Apparently, the administration hoped that hints of more forceful action would have a deterrent effect on Hanoi. As part of the reassessment, McNamara departed for Saigon.²⁰

(TS) Accompanied by General Taylor and other officials, the Defense Secretary reached South Vietnam early in March. He toured the countryside with Khanh to build up the Premier's image and dramatize U.S. support. However, he found the situation had deteriorated. There was virtually no "clear and hold" program and few directives were flowing from the new government. Nevertheless, McNamara and Taylor remained "guardedly optimistic," if Khanh stayed alive and in power. They still believed most U.S. personnel could be withdrawn by the end of 1965. For example, McNamara thought that the aircraft of the USAF O-1 squadron could soon be transferred to the expanding VNAF,* and that its personnel, as well as a U.S. Marine helicopter squadron, could depart by mid-1964.²¹

*See pp 56-57.

(TS) For the immediate future more U.S. assistance was needed. McNamara authorized additional manpower for MAC/V, continuation of special operations under Plan 34A the integration of the Vietnamese civilian irregular defense group (CIDG) into the regular armed forces, and aerial mining training for the VNAF. He refused, however, to approve any relaxation in the rules of engagement for the 1st Air Commando Squadron,* and held in abeyance a decision on the recent JCS proposal to replace B-26's with jet B-57's.[†] He said restrictions on defoliation activities would remain in effect and believed that the United States should "stay out of this business."²²

(TS) McNamara's report to President Johnson contained 12 major recommendations. Although the JCS considered them insufficient and again urged air attacks on North Vietnam, the President approved them on 17 March after conferring with the National Security Council. Generally they expanded or accelerated programs already in effect: support for the government's mobilization plans, a 50,000-man increase in Vietnamese regular and paramilitary strength, more compensation for the military, improved organization, establishment of a truly Vietnamese offensive guerrilla force, more equipment for the Vietnamese Army and Navy, addition of a third VNAF fighter squadron and the replacement of all T-28's with A-1H's, continued high-level reconnaissance flights over South Vietnamese borders, and support for more rural reform and a civil

* See p 68.

[†] See pp 50 and 52.

administration corps to work at the province, district, and hamlet level. The President also restated U.S. support for the Khanh government and opposition to more coups.

(TS) Most importantly, the President approved—for the first time—planning to permit on 72-hour notice retaliatory air strikes and on 30-day notice graduated strikes against North Vietnam and Vietnamese "hot pursuit" of Viet Cong units crossing into Laos. (Pursuit approval followed a South Vietnamese-Laotian agreement on resuming diplomatic relations and military planning. Vietnamese units over battalion size would require the approval of Laotian Premier Souvanna Phouma.) But any U.S. support of pursuit into Cambodia would be contingent on U.S.-Cambodian relations.* In separate decisions in March, the administration approved the transfer of three B-57 squadrons from Japan to the Philippines and the beginning of USAF special air warfare (SAW) training of Lao and Thai pilots in Thailand because of the Communist danger in Laos.²³

(TS) Meanwhile, at JCS request Felt and Harkins quickly developed plans in accordance with Presidential decisions. On 30 March, Felt sent Operational Plan 37-64 to the JCS. A three-part plan, it provided

* In 1963 Cambodia rejected further U.S. aid and broke diplomatic relations with South Vietnam. Throughout 1964 U.S.-Cambodian relations grew worse. A poorly defined border resulted in several erroneous bombings of villages by the Vietnamese and, on 24 October, in the downing of a USAF C-123 by Cambodian gunners, killing eight U.S. personnel. During the year Cambodia strengthened its ties with Hanoi, Peking, and Moscow. At year's end diplomatic talks in New Delhi, India, to resolve differences proved fruitless.

for limited U.S. air and ground support for Vietnamese operations for border control and retaliatory and graduated strikes, using VNAF, USAF, and Navy aircraft, against North Vietnam. The JCS approved it, with amendments, in July. Thereafter it evolved into one of CINCPAC's most comprehensive plans for stabilizing the military situation in South Vietnam and Laos, and three other CINCPAC plans eventually were incorporated into it. In June Harkins completed MAC/V Operational Plans 98-64 and 98A-64 for limited U.S. support of cross-border operations into Laos.²⁴

II. CONTINUED MILITARY AND POLITICAL DECLINE

(U) Although the President's 17 March decisions showed U.S. readiness to bring military pressure against the Communists in Laos and North Vietnam as well as in the South, the military and political situation in South Vietnam continued to deteriorate. The Army's low morale and irresolute leadership was increasingly manifest and not easily overcome by the infusion of more U.S. advice and military and economic aid. Some advisors on the scene credited many Viet Cong victories to Vietnamese apathy rather than to Viet Cong skill.¹

The Search for New Courses of Action

(TS) Alarmed over Communist gains, the JCS launched into another review of the military situation and in mid-April completed a new study for McNamara. The chiefs split in their recommendations. General LeMay and the Commandant of the Marine Corps strongly advocated immediate Vietnamese expansion of operations against North Vietnam backed by U.S. low-level reconnaissance and other forms of assistance. But the Army and Navy chiefs demurred, apparently feeling that momentarily the Saigon government was in no position to shoulder more military responsibility and risks. In subsequent months the Air Force and the Marine Corps again would be aligned on the side of more forceful action while the other two services recommended a more cautious approach.^{* 2}

* See pp 30, 35 and 37.

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(TS) In April Secretary of State Dean Rusk flew to Europe and Southeast Asia seeking "more flags" in South Vietnam from America's NATO and SEATO allies. After his return to Washington, Rusk proposed additional political and financial measures to strengthen internally the Saigon regime. To "signal" Hanoi, he recommended establishing a U.S. naval presence at Touraine or Cam Ranh Bay, more visible air training flights over Vietnam, and a diplomatic effort to impress upon Hanoi's leaders the benefits from "leaving its neighbors alone." He opposed another Geneva conference until the military situation improved.³

(TS) The JCS agreed that Rusk's proposals would improve the situation in the South but were insufficient to "turn the tide" to victory. Only greatly intensified counterinsurgency operations and a "positive" program of military pressure against the North could do this.⁴

(TS) Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Army Chief of Staff, after visiting South Vietnam, recommended that USAF air commando strength be increased to three squadrons, all equipped with A-1E's. He also recommended a "Hardnose" operation in Laos to disrupt Communist infiltration, and continuance of Plan 34A activities to help siphon off North Vietnam's resources.⁵

(TS) More Viet Cong successes and a lagging Vietnamese pacification program prompted President Johnson, in May, again to send McNamara

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and General Taylor to Saigon. Premier Khanh confessed he was unable to cope with the political problems. About 8,000,000 Vietnamese, he thought, were under Saigon's control but 6,000,000 were not, although all of the latter were not necessarily under the Viet Cong. But the Communists had the initiative as demonstrated by the loss of 200 of 2,500 villages since September 1963, the rise of "incidents" to 1,800 per month, and fewer casualties. Vietnamese forces, in turn, were suffering greater losses in casualties, weapons, and from desertions. Their morale was low and recruiting was difficult.⁶

More U.S. Aid and Reorganization of MAC/V

(TS) After his conferences, McNamara announced plans to enlarge the Vietnamese regular and paramilitary forces and provide other aid. The VNAF would receive more aircraft and a 100-percent increase in pilots. Observing the frequent changes in Vietnamese government and military leaders, the Defense Secretary conceded it would be a "long war," thus finally abandoning hope for withdrawing most U.S. forces by the end of 1965. On 19 May, President Johnson asked for and Congress shortly approved \$125 million to finance the additional military and economic aid.⁷

(S) In implementing actions, Harkins and Felt recommended and the JCS in late May approved the dispatch of more howitzers, grenade launchers, radar, and other equipment. To support the Chien Thang pacification plan, it agreed not only to retain all U.S. Army helicopters but to add one more Army helicopter unit. It also agreed on

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the need to retain indefinitely the U.S. Marine helicopter squadron, scheduled to depart in June, and re-equip it. McNamara quickly approved most of these recommendations.⁸

(S) In conjunction with these decisions, the administration streamlined its activities in Saigon by combining the Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam (MAAG/V) with MAC/V. Initially studied in February as a possible way to help revitalize counter-insurgency operations, the consolidation was opposed vigorously by General LeMay and the Navy and Marine Corps chiefs. They feared it might lead to the establishment of an Army specified command and would produce insignificant personnel and financial savings. Generals Taylor and Wheeler thought otherwise, however, and McNamara on 8 April concurred. The consolidation became effective on 15 May.⁹

(S) As a result of the change, the Air Force Section MAAG/V was redesignated the Air Force Advisory Group, MAC/V and placed under the operational control of the 2d Air Division. But military assistance program (MAP) responsibilities remained with the enlarged MAC/V.¹⁰


(S) Still under JCS and Defense Department consideration were Sullivan Committee proposals to increase drastically the number of U.S. advisors in South Vietnam to improve government efficiency, pacification, and paramilitary training.¹¹

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US MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM

31 DECEMBER 1964



* PROPOSED IN LATE 1964 BUT NOT FULLY APPROVED BY JCS AND SOD UNTIL 10 MAY 1965

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More Planning for Operations in Laos and North Vietnam

(U) In addition to devising measures to strengthen South Vietnam, administration planning addressed itself increasingly to neighboring Laos and North Vietnam.

(TS) In Laos, the Communists had long enjoyed a sanctuary for infiltrating men and arms to the Viet Cong. In April, Communist-led Pathet Lao forces attacked Laotian neutralist and right-wing forces, jeopardizing the 14-nation agreement of 23 July 1962 on the neutrality of Laos. Cautiously responding to both threats, U.S. authorities on 5 May instructed General Harkins to begin limited U.S.-Vietnamese planning for small ground patrols, aided by unmarked aircraft and helicopters. And on 19 May, USAF and Navy aircraft began "Yankee Team" reconnaissance* over Laos to aid friendly Laotian air and ground forces and observe infiltration routes. The administration desired to obtain a cease-fire and restore the military status quo ante.¹²

(TS) The administration also reviewed more plans—and the risks involved—in striking North Vietnam. At McNamara's request, the JCS studied additional "telegraphing" actions along with specific military pressure against Hanoi. It warned that certain types of actions, like deploying more U.S. forces to Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific, could lead to international demands for another Geneva-type conference before Hanoi altered its policy. Telegraphing actions in themselves, the JCS thought, would have little effect: only "positive" offensive

*See pp 73-80.

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measures could convince Hanoi that its support of the Viet Cong and the Pathet Lao no longer would be tolerated.¹³

(TS) LeMay believed that the war was being lost. Administration authorities had directed the JCS on 20 May to tighten its rules of engagement for U.S. air support within South Vietnam to lessen U.S. involvement. With respect to strategy against the North, LeMay pointed to two years of unsuccessful efforts to compel Hanoi to decide to end its subversion by examples of U.S. determination. The objective, he said, should be to destroy the North's capability, and to achieve this he proposed conveying the "message" by attacking sharply two important targets supporting the Viet Cong and Pathet Lao: Vinh and Dien Bien Phu.¹⁴

(TS) In this instance the Army and Navy chiefs agreed with LeMay but General Taylor considered the risk too great as both were huge targets. Air strikes would require hundreds of sorties for several days, be unnecessarily destructive, retard eventual "cooperation" with Hanoi, challenge the Communist bloc, and escalate the war. Of three JCS proposals considered—a massive air attack on all significant targets, a series of lesser attacks, and limited attacks to show U.S. will—Taylor favored the last although he asked Felt to prepare for all three. McNamara agreed with Taylor's conclusion. PACOM's commander submitted the plans to the JCS early in July.¹⁵

(TS) JCS advocacy of air strikes against North Vietnam had strong support in the State Department. The chairman of its Policy Planning Council, Walt W. Rostow, although opposed to a large-scale U.S. ground

commitment in Southeast Asia, agreed that the United States should demonstrate its willingness to use air and naval power to stop the insurgencies in South Vietnam and Laos. Warning of possible defeat, he said this would mean preparing for war to gain a political objective as in Cuba in 1962.¹⁶

(TS) Early in June, Rusk, McNamara, Taylor, and top field officials met in Honolulu to review the political and military situation. Rusk indicated that Premier Khanh's position was shaky and McNamara was pessimistic about the success of internal reform measures. In the war there was danger that the Viet Cong might push from Laos to the sea through Quang Ngai Province, cutting South Vietnam in half, and this was forcing Khanh to concentrate military forces in the north rather than in the south.

(TS) The conferees agreed that air strikes against North Vietnam should be authorized by Congress and preceded by an augmentation and redistribution of U.S. forces in the western Pacific and Thailand. Taylor postulated three levels of strikes against the North: using only the VNAF to demonstrate U.S. will; using USAF's 1st Air Commando Squadron and the VNAF to destroy Hanoi's will; and using the 1st Air Commando Squadron, the VNAF, and other U.S. air units to destroy Hanoi's ability to support the Viet Cong.

(TS) In the event the Chinese Communists intervened, McNamara thought air attacks could reduce the Chinese effort by 50 percent if enough conventional bombs were available, but this would not resolve

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the problem of coping with 5 to 18 Chinese divisions. Felt believed that the United States would run out of aircraft before enough conventional bombs were dropped to defeat the Chinese. On the other hand, to resort to nuclear weapons, said Rusk, was "a most serious" matter and he foresaw the possibility of Soviet counteraction elsewhere to U.S. strikes on the North.¹⁷

(TS) The conferees further agreed to provide more U.S. military and economic aid for the Khanh government. Another decision required the services to review their available shipping, manpower, reconnaissance, airlift, ordnance, and command post resources, and future requirements to sustain the "escalation" phases of CINCPAC's Operational Plans 32-64 and 37-64. McNamara directed the Army to prepare for the dispatch of an infantry brigade and asked the JCS to submit a joint U.S.-Thai military plan for defense of the Mekong delta and for punitive action against Communist forces in northern Laos.¹⁸

(TS) There was more planning against the threat in Laos. Limited U.S.-Vietnamese planning was authorized on 5 May and in late June the JCS sent McNamara MAC/V's plans for Vietnamese cross-border operations. Fuller consultation with Saigon was now required but the State Department would not allow this until political objections raised by the U.S. Ambassador in Laos were resolved. The delay greatly troubled the Air Staff.¹⁹

(TS) Laotian planning also figured in a JCS reply to the National Security Council (NSC) request for guidance. Deeply concerned over the

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growing U.S. commitment in Southeast Asia, the NSC in July asked for a restrictive program that would aid the counterinsurgency effort in South Vietnam and reduce the defeatism of South Vietnam and its leaders, but minimize U.S. participation and the risk of military escalation. The Joint Chiefs offered three courses of action: ground cross-border operations into Laos against infiltration targets, air strikes on Laotian infiltration routes, and selected air attacks on North Vietnam with unmarked aircraft. The JCS warned, however, that while its proposals would have some military and psychological value—provided the effort did not absorb counterinsurgency resources—they would not significantly affect Communist support for the Viet Cong. And they might aggravate the political situation in Laos.²⁰

(TS) Overall planning trends were now strongly weighted toward expanded use of airpower. In late July, the JCS directed CINCPAC to plot 94 key North Vietnam targets, a list subsequently included in CINCPAC's 37-64 plan.²¹

New U.S. Leadership and More Military Aid

(U) Coincident with planning operations against Laos and North Vietnam were changes in U.S. military and diplomatic leadership in Saigon. On 20 June Gen. William C. Westmoreland, deputy to General Harkins, became the commander of MAC/V. On the 23d President Johnson announced that General Taylor would succeed Ambassador Lodge* and that

*Gen. Taylor officially succeeded Lodge on 2 July.

U. Alexis Johnson would become Deputy Ambassador, a newly created post. General Wheeler, the Army's Chief of Staff, succeeded Taylor as JCS chairman. On 30 June Adm. U.S. Grant Sharp succeeded Admiral Felt as CINCPAC. The changes were accompanied by a new warning to the Communists on the 28th by President Johnson. He said that the United States was prepared to "risk war" to preserve peace in Southeast Asia and would continue to stand firm to help South Vietnam maintain its freedom.²²

(TS) Almost simultaneously MAC/V asked for more U.S. military advisors, units, and equipment. For expanded air operations the Army would provide 27 more CH-1B helicopters and 16 CV-2B Caribou transports (and a few supporting aircraft), while the Air Force would deploy a fourth C-123 squadron (16 aircraft), 25 A-1E's (for the second combat training squadron approved on 5 May),* and six HH-43B helicopters for a search-and-rescue (SAR) unit. There would be more air liaison officer and forward air controller (ALO/FAC) teams for stepped up combat training and close air support operations.²³

(TS) MAC/V's request was followed by more South Vietnamese setbacks in July. The Viet Cong stepped up its attacks in the Mekong delta, Vietnamese forces suffered a major defeat in Chuang Province, and on the 20th there was another coup attempt in Saigon. U.S. officials now estimated Viet Cong strength at 34,000 with about 30 percent of the infiltrators coming from the North, and irregular forces at 68,000.

* See p 51.

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Concluding that counterinsurgency activities were insufficient and that only direct pressure on the North could defeat the Viet Cong, Premier Khanh's government agreed to U.S.-Vietnamese planning for such action without a firm U.S. commitment.²⁴

(TS) Meeting with McNamara on 20 July, the JCS generally supported MAC/V's proposals except for additional Army helicopters and Caribous. LeMay and the Commandant, Marine Corps, strongly believed that the Army aviation units required more justification in view of available USAF and VNAF aircraft for close support and airlift. They were subsequently overruled by the Defense Secretary.²⁵

(TS) After assessing MAC/V's ability to absorb quickly the additional personnel, aircraft, and equipment, the administration announced on 27 July that about 5,000* more U.S. military personnel would go to South Vietnam, raising the total there to 21,950. Most of the manpower and equipment would arrive by 30 September as MAC/V wished, but some units could not be absorbed or sent until November and December. These were the fourth C-123 squadron, the SAR unit, five A-1E's, 20 (of 40 requested) ALO/FAC teams, and 336 jeeps. More civilian technical advisors also would be sent. For certain units, final approval to deploy was still pending.²⁶

* After adjustments, the figure was reduced to 4,800 personnel.

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III. THE GULF OF TONKIN INCIDENT AND AFTERMATH

(U) In March, May, and July the administration was forced to provide more aid for South Vietnam. Counterinsurgency operations were proving ineffectual in the face of demoralized Vietnamese leadership and rising Viet Cong strength and aggressive tactics. As a consequence, planning focused increasingly on airpower as a means to reverse defeats. Early in August, the Communists supplied the provocation needed to launch an air attack on North Vietnam.

U.S. Response in the Gulf of Tonkin

(TS) On 2 August the U.S. Navy destroyer Maddox, part of a patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin, detected three hostile patrol boats closing in at high speed. After three warning shots failed to halt them, the destroyer opened fire with its 5-inch batteries. One boat was disabled but succeeded in firing two torpedoes that missed the Maddox by 200 yards; a second boat lost power and retired, and a third, also struck, passed 1,700 yards astern the Maddox, firing a machine gun. In response the United States reinforced the patrol by adding a destroyer (the C. Turner Joy) and an aircraft carrier (Ticonderoga). On the night of 3 August enemy boats again attacked the patrol. In return fire, one was presumed sunk.

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(TS) On 4 August, immediately after the second attack, Admiral Sharp proposed and the JCS and the President agreed to conduct punitive air strikes against North Vietnam. These were launched on 5 August when Navy A-1 Skyraiders, A-4 Skyhawks, and F-8 Crusaders from the Ticonderoga and the Constellation flew 64 sorties, attacking four torpedo bases at Hon Gay, Loc Chao, Phuoc Loi, and Quang Khe and an oil storage facility at Vinh.* Eight boats were destroyed and 21 damaged and the Vinh oil facility, representing about 10 percent of North Vietnam's oil storage capacity, was 90 percent destroyed. Two aircraft, an A-1 and an A-4, were shot down by antiaircraft fire over Hon Gay killing one pilot. The other was taken prisoner. Two other aircraft were hit but returned safely. No USAF aircraft participated in these strikes.¹

(TS) Simultaneously, the President publicly warned the Communist world not to support or widen aggression in Southeast Asia, and McNamara, with the President's approval, announced the dispatch of more U.S. reinforcements to the area.⁺ Pacific theater shifts brought 50 additional USAF aircraft (B-57's, F-102's, RF-101's) to South Vietnam and 26 (F-105's, F-100's, KB-50's) to Thailand. Other aircraft (F-105's, C-130's) from the United States went to U.S. bases in Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines. From its First Fleet on the Pacific Coast the U.S. Navy sent the supercarrier Ranger, 12 destroyers, an antisubmarine

*The code name for the air strike was "Pierce Arrow."

⁺The initial deployment of air units was called "One Buck," and subsequent deployments were "Two Buck," "Three Buck," etc.

task force, and selected Marine units. The Army sent additional aviation and ground units. Tours of duty for tactical units deployed in support of CINCPAC Plan 37-64 were extended indefinitely. Total U.S. force authorization for South Vietnam was raised to 23,308.²

(U) On 7 August, at the request of President Johnson, the Congress approved overwhelmingly a resolution assuring the Chief Executive of support:³

. . . the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.

. . . Consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in the defense of its freedom.

Signed by the President on 10 August, the resolution was similar to those approved by Congress during the crises in the Formosa Strait in 1955,* in the Middle East in 1958,* and in Cuba in 1962.

(TS) Hanoi, Peking, and Moscow accused the United States of "provocative" action and pledged continued support for the insurgents. Some neutralist nations and U.S. allies were concerned about the

* See AFCHO studies, Air Operations in the Taiwan Crisis, 1958, and Air Operations in the Lebanon Crisis, 1958.

reprisal strikes on North Vietnam but others, such as Thailand, were heartened. Tension increased as Chinese MIG's on Hainan Island were observed flying periodically toward South Vietnam. There were "scrambles" of USAF F-102's and Navy F-4's and F-8's to meet them. On 8 August, one such operation involved 30 U.S. jets. Meanwhile, on the 7th, reconnaissance showed 36 MIG-15's and -17's on Phuc Yen Airfield in North Vietnam, flown in presumably by Chinese- or Soviet-trained Vietnamese pilots.⁴

(TS) The buildup of combat aircraft in Southeast Asia and in other parts of the Pacific and the possibility of air action focused attention on the problem of command and control. Admiral Sharp concluded that his Operational Plan 99-64 (to cover military operations against North Vietnam and to stabilize the situation in Laos) now was more relevant than Operational Plan 37-64 (to stabilize the military situation in South Vietnam). Therefore, he proposed to control land-based air forces through his component commanders. PACAF, as the Air Force component command, would control 13th Air Force and 2d Air Division aircraft. Sharp believed this would allow MAC/V, which was inadequately manned for jet combat operations, to concentrate on counterinsurgency actions and only monitor 2d Air Division activities.⁵

A New Round of Planning

(TS) To the dismay of the JCS, the confrontation in the Gulf of Tonkin did not result in follow-up strikes. Instead, the administration

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pursued a "holding action" to await Communist response and place upon Hanoi the onus for escalating the war. Over strong JCS objections, the administration halted temporarily the Navy's patrol in the gulf, some special operations under Plan 34A and slackened support for T-28 strikes in Laos.⁶

(S) State Department and other agency proposals were reviewed intensively. To the extent these proposals provided additional (if limited) pressure on the North, and for U.S.-Vietnamese planning, VNAF training, cross-border activities, and similar measures, the JCS agreed with them. But it considered such actions insufficient. Administration leaders, conversely, believed that in view of a weakening Saigon government the situation demanded U.S. prudence and, for the moment, no further escalation.⁷

(TS) Premier Khanh's regime, meanwhile, was given only a 50-50 chance to remain in power. Apprehensions about the stability of his government arose when the Military Revolutionary Council on 16 August ousted General Minh as president, elected Khanh to that post, and promulgated a new constitution giving him near dictatorial powers. These changes set off more Buddhist rioting and other civil disturbances, culminating in late August in a one-week "resignation" by Khanh.

(TS) Later, Ambassador Taylor observed ruefully that there was "no George Washington in sight" in Saigon. However, he said that there was no alternative to continued U.S. support because of the dire effects

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an American defeat in Southeast Asia would have in Asia, Africa, and South America. He averred publicly that Viet Cong insurgency could not be defeated by military means in the foreseeable future. A U.S. intelligence report stated that the odds were against the emergence of a stable government in Saigon but suggested one might be created after the release of pent-up pressures and the sobering effects of instability were realized fully by the Vietnamese.⁸

(TS) The JCS continued to review and comment on many proposals. On 24 August it sent McNamara another list of North Vietnam air targets, which, if bombed, would possibly end Hanoi's support of the Viet Cong and Pathet Lao. The targets were divided into five categories: airfields, lines of communication, military installations, industrial sites, and certain others suitable for armed reconnaissance missions.⁹

(TS) On the 26th the JCS recommended a number of priority actions that should be taken without delay. They included: resumption of patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin and in support of Plan 34A operations; retaliatory air strikes in response to large-scale Viet Cong or Pathet Lao actions; attacks against the Viet Cong leadership; Vietnam-Thailand air operations with U.S. support on communication lines in the Laotian corridor; "hot pursuit" into Cambodia; stricter patrols of the Mekong and Bassac Rivers; more pacification projects with the emphasis on the Hop Tac program* around Saigon; and buildup of U.S. combat units.

*The Hop Tac program, concentrating on seven provinces around Saigon, began in September. Initial results were meager but by the end of 1964 it was one of the few areas where pacification efforts showed some success.

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(TS) As the JCS were doubtful if these proposals would deter Hanoi, it asked additionally for more U.S. forces to support CINCPAC's 37-65 plan and the inauguration of air strikes on North Vietnam. The JCS believed that only stepped up and forceful action could prevent a complete collapse of the U.S. position in Southeast Asia.¹⁰

(TS) Despite much unanimity on what should be done, the JCS was divided over the timing and severity of the proposed strikes on the North. General Wheeler and the Army and Navy chiefs agreed with Ambassador Taylor that the United States should not create an incident by an immediate attack but respond appropriately to the next Viet Cong strike on a U.S. unit. General LeMay and the Marine Corps chief argued, however, that time was running out and that air strikes were imperative. They advocated a retaliatory U.S.-Vietnamese air attack after the next "significant" Viet Cong incident, if only a battalion-size operation, in accordance with the 94-target plan, and more public statements on U.S. determination to defend South Vietnam.¹¹

(TS) LeMay was greatly distressed over U.S. policy. He believed that the "message" delivered to the Communists on 5 August in response to their attacks in the Gulf of Tonkin had been nullified by other U.S. actions. There was the apparent leak to the press, for example, of a Central Intelligence Agency study indicating U.S. desire to negotiate, and the reduction of Laotian Air Force T-28 strikes in Laos. He perceived undue concern over escalation and the desire to strengthen Saigon politically before striking North, whereas air strikes, in his view,

would strengthen Saigon's political base. Believing that U.S. restraint was being practiced to the point of inadequacy, LeMay urged--unsuccessfully--quick implementation of the JCS recommendations of 26 August and the deployment of more ground forces to Thailand.¹²

New U.S. Guidance

(TS) Out of the interminable high level conferences and policy reviews, the President's chief advisors emerged in early September with new proposals. Concluding that the internal political turmoil would leave the Khanh government in the next two or three months too weak to allow the United States to risk military escalation, they drew up a "low risk" program. The objective was to improve Vietnamese morale but also to show that the United States "meant business."¹³

(TS) On 10 September President Johnson approved part of the program: resumption of U.S. Navy patrols, with air cover, beyond the 12-mile limit in the Tonkin Gulf; resumption of Plan 34A air, leaflet, and maritime operations; U.S.-Laos discussions on allowing limited air and ground action in Laos by the Vietnamese supported by Lao pilots and possibly U.S. armed reconnaissance; preparations to retaliate against the North for the next important Viet Cong attack on a U.S. or Vietnamese unit; and specific aid measures, regardless of cost, such as pay raises for Vietnamese civilians or for special projects that would help the Khanh government. The President emphasized that the "first order of business" was to strengthen the political fabric of the country.¹⁴

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The Low Risk Policy

(TS) Cautiously, the administration pursued its "low risk" policy against North Vietnam. On 15 September, the JCS authorized resumption of a patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin. But on the 18th, there occurred another incident between the patrol and Communist craft. U.S. ships fired on them in the darkness and the JCS ordered Sharp to prepare for reprisal strikes. But a search of the waters disclosed no positive evidence of an attack—although the Navy was convinced one was made. As a consequence, the administration refused to sanction an air strike. And to avoid another incident, it suspended, despite CINCPAC and JCS recommendations to the contrary, further patrols until early December.¹⁵

(TS) The continuing concern over escalation prompted more preparations to use airpower. On 21 September the JCS approved CINCPAC's Operational Plan 39-65. It was designed to counter a Chinese attack alone or in league with North Vietnam and North Korea against South Vietnam, South Korea, or other parts of Asia. To the Air Force, the plan was a milestone in that it provided for the destruction by air of the enemy's primary military, economic, and logistic targets—"where it would hurt the most." Heretofore, the Army and Marine Corps had opposed an air plan on the premise that airpower alone was no substitute for ground forces.¹⁶

(TS) The JCS also revised its plans for air strikes against North Vietnam. At the suggestion of LeMay, who pointed to the danger

of air opposition (especially after 36 MIG's arrived at Phuc Yen Airfield in August), the service chiefs approved a change in the 94-target objectives. Air strikes, if conducted, would inflict maximum damage on selected targets. This contrasted with the initial strategy of diffusing strikes among the targets and causing less damage on individual ones. When completed on 17 December, the revision required an increase in USAF's force structure in Asia.¹⁷

(TS) The President's approval of U.S.-Laotian discussion on Vietnamese cross-border operations to reduce the infiltration of men and materiel through Laos into South Vietnam^{*} again spurred preparations on this long-delayed project. In July the JCS had sent MAC/V's plans to McNamara. Now there was more discussion on the type and extent of U.S. support. The Air Force and Army debated the relative value of air and ground action with the Army asserting that airpower would be restricted by the jungle canopy and the weather.¹⁸

(TS) On 30 September the JCS agreed to an air-ground plan to support the Vietnamese. It provided for coordination with the Yankee Team-Laotian Air Force operations already under way in Laos. USAF aircraft would help to suppress antiaircraft fire and strike difficult targets, such as bridges. Ground forces, with attached U.S. advisors, beginning 1 November would penetrate into three areas up to 20 kilometers.¹⁹

* Headquarters MAC/V estimated that from January to August 1964, 4,700 Communists had entered South Vietnam: from 1959 to August 1964, the total was 34,000 with 31,500 of them military personnel.

[REDACTED]

(TS) But political turbulence in Saigon,^{*} frequent personnel changes in the Vietnamese high command, and difficulties with Montagnard tribesmen (some of whom had begun to revolt in September) prompted the administration to limit and finally to postpone the venture. On 7 October a State-Defense directive forbade for the time being any U.S. strike participation and permitted only combat air patrol. On the 21st McNamara ordered the JCS to limit the project to planning only. A few days later General Westmoreland reported that Saigon's political weakness would preclude any cross-border undertaking until 1 January 1965.²⁰

(TS) Meanwhile, General LeMay pointed to a disturbing intelligence report showing, he thought, that Saigon's political problems were virtually beyond resolution. He again urged the JCS to agree to an immediate air response to the next "significant" move such as a battalion-size or a terrorist attack. He recommended a strike by VNAF A-1H's with USAF F-100's and F-102's and Navy aircraft providing cover. As U.S. intelligence indicated that the Communists had every reason to regard favorably present trends, LeMay thought it unlikely that they would provoke the United States, even if U.S.-Vietnamese forces struck North. His assessment that the Communists probably would not attempt another provocative act (as in the Gulf of Tonkin) was shared by the Army.²¹

* On 13 September there was another coup attempt against Premier Khanh. On 26 September a High National Council was established, charged with setting up, if possible, a civilian government.

[REDACTED]

(TS) But the JCS agreed only to somewhat less precipitous courses of action, mostly old, a few new, inside and outside of South Vietnam, all in a new order of ascending severity. Sent to McNamara on 22 October, the JCS paper observed, however, that the USAF and Marine Corps chiefs believed that "time was running out," and that there was no alternative to a prompt air strike on North Vietnam. McNamara promised to convey their views to the White House but advised that Ambassador Taylor was reluctant to increase pressure on Hanoi while Saigon was without a responsible government.²²

(TS) So critical was the situation that preparations began for a possible collapse of the South Vietnamese regime and the emergence of an unfriendly one that might ask for the withdrawal of U.S. forces. For this eventuality, the Air Force considered steps to protect major U.S. airfields and redeploy U.S. and friendly Vietnamese air and ground units to Thailand, the Philippines, and elsewhere. To prepare for any contingency, LeMay directed his commanders to assess their ability to support PACAF's plans and to report any inadequacies or the need for more guidance.²³

(U) On 30 October U.S. pessimism about Saigon's political future was tempered slightly. General Khanh voluntarily resigned as Premier to allow Saigon's former mayor, Tran Van Huong, the new Premier, to install South Vietnam's first civilian government since the overthrow of President Diem a year earlier.²⁴

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IV. THE BIEN HOA AIR BASE ATTACK AND AFTERMATH

In addition to a new Vietnamese civilian government, the end of October also witnessed a new policy crisis. An impression that the Viet Cong, seeing only auguries of success, might refrain from another dramatic strike against the United States was dispelled quickly.

The Bien Hoa Incident

(S) On the night of 31 October-1 November, Viet Cong troops eluded successfully Vietnamese army security guards around Bien Hoa Air Base, creeping within 1,500 meters of the control tower. They fired about 80 rounds of mortars for 30 minutes against the tower, the packed flight line, and the bivouac area. The attack was costly. The Air Force suffered 7 aircraft destroyed (6 B-57's and 1 H-43 helicopter) and 16 damaged (13 B-57's and 3 H-43's). VNAF losses were 3 aircraft destroyed (all A-1H's) and 5 damaged (3 A-1H's and 2 C-47's). In addition, three houses, a mess hall, vehicles, and fuel tanks were destroyed or badly damaged. U.S. casualties were 4 personnel killed and 30 badly wounded plus 42 personnel with lesser wounds. Vietnamese casualties were 2 killed and 5 wounded.¹

(S) Within 5 minutes after the attack began, base defense teams and aircraft sprang into action, but the enemy escaped. The next day

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800 Vietnamese troops, supported by helicopters, likewise could find no trace of the guerrillas. Momentarily, the losses were a blow to PACAF. And coming on the eve of a national holiday* in South Vietnam and an American presidential election, the incident, according to news media, was a blow to U.S. prestige.²

(TS) Top U.S. officials—Admiral Sharp, General Westmoreland, Ambassador Taylor, the JCS—expected the administration to order immediately reprisal air strikes. The JCS, having suddenly resolved the major differences over the timing and severity of military reprisal, orally gave unanimous support on 1 November. But the administration again demurred. Compared with previous Viet Cong incidents, it believed that the attack on Bien Hoa differed mainly in degree and damage done and was not necessarily an act of major escalation. There was reluctance to retaliate simply because the attack was directed primarily at the United States, and deep concern lest a strike against the North would trigger, in turn, air and ground action by Hanoi and Peking. And there was the overriding need to establish political stability in Saigon.³

(TS) The administration's initial response was to order the immediate replacement of the destroyed B-57 aircraft, warn Hanoi and Peking not to expect a change in U.S. policy in Asia after the American elections (on 3 November), and express encouragement about the latest complexion of the Saigon government and a few recent military successes.

*To celebrate the first anniversary of the fall of the Diem government on 1 November 1963.

Publicly, Washington officials differentiated between the Bien Hoa and Gulf of Tonkin attacks, asserting that there would have to be "broader reasons" for making a retaliatory strike against North Vietnam.⁴

(TS) On 4 November, still convinced that a U.S. riposte was in order, the JCS reaffirmed its views and urged McNamara to approve immediately armed reconnaissance of infiltration targets in North Vietnam up to 19 degrees latitude, and strikes against the Techepone and Ben They areas and two bridges in Laos. Within 60 to 72 hours, the JCS said, there should be night strikes against Phuc Yen Airfield in the North by 30 B-52's, and VNAF and U.S. strikes on some of the other "94 targets." It further recommended instant deployment of Marine or Army units to provide more security for the Bien Hoa and Da Nang air bases, and the evacuation of U.S. dependents from Saigon.

(TS) The JCS warned that the Communists and America's Southeast Asia allies might misconstrue U.S. restraint. In response to another query from McNamara, the Joint Chiefs assured him that U.S. forces could deal with any military "response" by Hanoi or Peking, and expressed confidence in the stability of the new Huong government to permit "positive" U.S. action. They objected to Ambassador Taylor's proposal for a "tit for tat" strike policy henceforth against the North.⁵

(TS) Again JCS counsel was not accepted. Subsequently, McNamara informed the Joint Chiefs that their views were being considered in

interdepartmental deliberations on future U.S. action in Southeast Asia.⁶

The Problem of Base Security

(U) If retaliatory strikes against North Vietnam were not warranted, a review of U.S. base security was. Its weaknesses now underwent thorough scrutiny.

(S) Since late 1961 primary responsibility for base security rested with the Vietnamese armed forces. Periodically the Air Force had asked for more protection, especially for Tan Son Nhut, Bien Hoa, and Da Nang. Air Force concern rose after the Gulf of Tonkin incident in August and the deployment of B-57's from Clark AB, the Philippines, to Bien Hoa. Some improvements were made, enabling the JCS, on 1 September, to agree that security was adequate.⁷

(S) But security was largely in the hands of the Vietnamese and was effective only to the extent they accepted the responsibility. From mid-1964 on, the progressively weakening Saigon government reduced, in turn, Vietnamese Army concern and protection. As a consequence, General LeMay on 28 September ordered another review of base defenses. Oversaturation at Bien Hoa was quite apparent and this resulted, fortuitously, in a decision to redeploy on 31 October, only hours before the Viet Cong attack on the air base, 20 B-57's from Bien Hoa to Clark AB. This saved many bombers from destruction or damage.⁸

(S) On the eve of the attack, defense measures at the three main airfields consisted of joint USAF-VNAF manning of the inner and

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Vietnamese Army manning of the outer perimeter. There were also special command posts, and helicopters and flare aircraft on alert.⁹

(S) As a result of losses at Bien Hoa, a board of inquiry was convened by USAF Maj. Gen. Milton D. Adams of MAC/V's staff. The joint research and test agency (JRATA)* unit was directed to examine tactical air base needs. Other studies were undertaken. Top Air Force leaders urged changes in the U.S.-Vietnamese agreement to allow U.S. combat troops, Army or Marine, to secure and control an 8,000-meter area around each airfield.¹⁰

(TS) But Sharp, Westmoreland, and Taylor opposed the use of combat troops, asserting they would be ineffectual. The troops would lack language and area knowledge and authority to search private dwellings, cause political and psychological difficulties, and encourage the Vietnamese to relax still more their security efforts. Sharp recommended to the JCS only 502 more police-type personnel for base defense: 292 Air Force, 52 Army, and 153 Marine personnel. For backup, there was afloat offshore a marine brigade and a special landing force.¹¹

(TS) LeMay thought differently. Pointing to the lack of surveillance, the ease of infiltration, and the prospect of more damage to U.S. property, he wanted Sharp to reassess the ability of the Vietnamese to provide base security. If they were unable to do so, U.S. combat troops, he reiterated, should be used. For the interim, he and the other service chiefs accepted Sharp's proposal to augment base defense

*See p 68.

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strength by 502 personnel and, on 23 December, sent this recommendation to McNamara. No decision had been made by the end of the year.¹²

Review of Future Courses of Action

(U) Having again elected not to respond to a "provocation," the administration launched into another review of U.S. policy.

(TS) On 1 November, immediately after the Bien Hoa attack, the State Department proposed three "options": continue existing policies and take no reprisal action except to Viet Cong "spectaculars" like Bien Hoa; apply immediately more military pressure to show firm U.S. determination but also willingness to negotiate; apply graduated and carefully controlled military pressure in concert with political action to end Hanoi's support of the South Vietnam and Laos insurgencies. They formed the basis of a report by the NSC Working Group, now headed by William F. Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. The group favored the third option and its pursuit for six to eight months while the door to negotiations was left open. In subsequent days the three alternatives were refined extensively.¹³

(TS) The consequences of North Vietnam strikes were thoroughly reviewed. At White House request, the JCS on 14 November sent an analysis of possible Hanoi-Peking reaction. The Joint Chiefs believed that the fear of massive retaliation would prompt the Communists to rely on propaganda and diplomacy rather than on enlarging the war. If the Chinese Communists felt compelled "to do something," they might

enter Laos, perhaps at the invitation of the Pathet Lao, but not North Vietnam unless Vietnamese or U.S. forces occupied territory in either Laos or in the North, or attacked Chinese soil. Admittedly, the Chinese might intervene for "irrational" reasons or through miscalculation. But on balance, the risks inherent in striking North Vietnam were preferable to continuing the current policy or withdrawing from Southeast Asia. As a precaution, the JCS favored the deployment of two additional USAF fighter squadrons, more USAF reconnaissance and tanker aircraft, and another Navy carrier to Southeast Asia. Except for the latter phases of CINCPAC's 32-64 and 39-65 plans, there would be no logistic difficulties in carrying out the 94-target attack.¹⁴

(TS) The Air Force especially did not think air strikes on the North would trigger a major air and land war nor lead to an untenable U.S. negotiating position, two objections raised by the working group.¹⁵

(TS) In reply to another McNamara request, the JCS sent him proposed U.S. objectives if the policy of graduated military pressure was adopted.¹⁶

(TS) On 23 November, in another paper, the JCS informed McNamara that there were five rather than three courses of action that should be considered: (1) withdrawal from South Vietnam and Laos (and abandonment of U.S. objectives); (2) continue current policy with improvements where possible (with no likelihood of attaining U.S.

objectives); (3) graduated military and political pressures as proposed by the NSC Working Group (with inconclusive objectives and high risk as the uncertain pace could encourage enemy buildup); (4) graduated military pressure to reduce North Vietnamese capability to support the insurgencies in South Vietnam and Laos (probably achieving U.S. objectives); and (5) rapid and forceful military pressure (involving the least risk, casualties, and costs, insuring less possibility of enemy miscalculation and intervention, and most likely to achieve U.S. objectives). The JCS recommended adoption of the fifth course of action.¹⁷

(TS) Having examined JCS and other agency viewpoints, President Johnson on 2 December issued another policy guide for South Vietnam. It followed most closely a sixth view submitted by the Office of International Security Affairs in OSD. The President concluded that South Vietnam's problems were two--government instability and Viet Cong insurgency as aided by the North. But the two problems were of unequal importance. Viet Cong actions were only contributory whereas a stable government in Saigon, in accordance with recent policy, was of paramount importance. Thus the United States could not risk preventing its establishment. This was the antithesis of the long-held Air Force--and lately--JCS position that gave top priority to ending North Vietnam's support for the insurgency.¹⁸

(U) After this decision, the President instructed Ambassador Taylor to "consult urgently" with South Vietnam's leaders to improve

the internal situation in their country. Taylor foresaw no immediate need for more U.S. military personnel, now numbering about 22,000, nor for major changes in prosecuting the war except in tactics.¹⁹

(TS) The President approved limited but graduated military pressure, largely by air. A two-phase program required heavier Laotian T-28 strikes and U.S. armed reconnaissance (Barrel Roll) missions along infiltration routes in the Laos corridor and special Plan 34A maritime operations against the North. The air attacks would be primarily psychological, warning Hanoi of U.S. strength. There would also be initial steps to end the flow of U.S. dependents to Saigon.²⁰

(TS) After a transition period of unspecified duration between the first and second phases, additional military pressure for two to six months would be exerted. There would be more high- and low-level reconnaissance and maritime operations against the North, and heavier strikes against infiltration routes near the South Vietnam-Laos border. This stage would require some augmentation of U.S. strength and include the deployment of 150 or more U.S. aircraft and the alerting of ground forces for Southeast Asia.²¹

(TS) As the program of graduated military pressure began, Taylor, on returning to Saigon, plunged into a series of conferences with Premier Huong and other Vietnamese and U.S. officials. They discussed the use of \$60 to \$70 million in U.S. aid to speed up economic and rural development, more effective measures against Communist infiltration,

expansion of the Vietnamese military and police forces, and other topics. A joint *communiqué* on 11 December on the meetings reaffirmed U.S. support for the *Huong* government.²²

(S) With respect to increasing Vietnamese military strength, the JCS on 17 December approved a MAC/V proposal to add 30,309 men to the regular forces (for an authorized total of 273,908), and 110,941 to the non-regular forces. The VNAF would gain 342 spaces. The augmentation would also require 446 more U.S. military advisors. The new U.S. authorized manpower ceiling in South Vietnam was 22,755.*²³ On 13 January 1965, McNamara approved the JCS recommendations subject to final approval by the State Department.²⁴

Continuing Crisis and a New Incident

(U) The administration's latest attempt to create political stability in Saigon while simultaneously applying low-key military pressure on the Communists was disrupted in mid-December by another political upheaval. Buddhists began a new drive to unseat Premier *Huong* and bitterly attacked Ambassador Taylor. There were more military setbacks. On 20 December a group of "Young Turks" led by Air Commodore Ky⁺ and Brig. Gen. *Nguyen Chan Thi*, Commander of the Army I Corps, overthrew the civilian-oriented High National Council and arrested some of its members. This partial coup, which left U.S. officials close to despair, put the military through the Armed Forces

* Revised from 23,308. See p 26.

+ During 1964 the rank of VNAF's commander changed from brigadier general to air commodore. See p 3.

Council again in the ascendancy and left the tenure of Premier Huong in doubt.²⁵

(U) The U.S. government tried to be firm. Ambassador Taylor in Saigon and Secretary Rusk in Washington warned that unless civilian rule was restored, the United States might have to review its aid and other commitments to South Vietnam. On the 26th, administration officials directed all U.S. military advisors to withdraw from advance planning of nonroutine military and civilian operations until the future of U.S. aid was clarified. This strong stand drew a sharp blast from General Khanh, now siding with the Young Turks, who severely criticized Taylor for interfering in Vietnamese affairs. In the closing days of 1964, the political crisis eased and Huong was still Premier although the High National Council had not been reconstituted.²⁶

(TS) In the midst of the political turmoil, the administration's restraint was again challenged on 24 December when the Viet Cong bombed the U.S.-occupied Brink Hotel* in Saigon. The blast killed two Americans and wounded 64. Forty-three Vietnamese were wounded. The JCS recommended an immediate reprisal air attack on Army barracks at Vit Thu Lin in North Vietnam. CINCPAC alerted Navy air--rather than PACAF--for the reprisal, if authorized. Again the administration chose not to respond.²⁷

*Between 3 February and 27 December 1964, the Viet Cong engaged in 61 attacks against U.S. personnel, exclusive of the Gulf of Tonkin incident. The attacks included grenades thrown at vehicles and into bars, sniper fire, entry into U.S. compounds and bombing of hotels.

(S) As 1965 began, administration policy of seeking a political solution in Saigon first rather than a military victory against the Viet Cong was in question. Observing that the coups were getting worse and that current U.S. strategy was not working, General LeMay reiterated his view that the only alternative was to strike North Vietnam, although he said the hour was so late this might not stop the aggression. He foresaw danger lest rioting spread to the Vietnamese armed forces, the only cohesive element in the country, and the possible loss of everything in South Vietnam including American lives. He recognized the fact that the Chinese Communist might intervene and believed that the United States should be prepared to take care of them by air. Using only conventional ordnance, this would be a major task. In a big war, he thought, a few nuclear weapons on carefully selected targets would be a more efficient way "to do the job."²⁸

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V. BUILDUP OF USAF FORCES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

(U) While the administration sought desperately in 1964 to halt the political and military decline in South Vietnam, the demand for more aircraft rose.

(S) At the end of 1963 U.S. and Vietnamese fixed wing and rotary aircraft in South Vietnam totaled about 690. The Air Force possessed approximately 120, all controlled by Headquarters, 2d Air Division at Tan Son Nhut Airfield near Saigon. Its major units were the 33d and 34th Tactical Groups, the 315th Troop Carrier Group, and the 23d Air Base Group. Also under the 2d's control was the 35th Tactical Group in Thailand. On 31 January the 2d's commander, Maj. Gen. Rollen H. Anthis, was replaced by Maj. Gen. Joseph H. Moore, Jr.¹

(S) The 2d's aircraft consisted of 22 O-1's, 49 C-123's, 6 RF-101's, 2 RB-57's, 6 F-100's, 4 F-102's, 13 T-28's, and 18 B-26's. The F-102's were stationed at Don Muang Airport, Thailand. The B-26's and T-28's were assigned to the 34th Group's 1st Air Commando Squadron (previously Farmgate), a combat training unit. To limit U.S. combat training participation, the 1st operated under rules of engagement that severely circumscribed its activities. USAF efforts in 1962 and 1963 to change the rules were unsuccessful.²

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(S) In the spring of 1964 two circumstances led to a critical shortage of aircraft for the 1st Air Commando Squadron. In one instance, investigation of a B-26 crash at Hurlburt Field, Fla., in February showed that the aircraft had experienced structural failure. As a consequence, the B-26's in South Vietnam were grounded temporarily, then permitted to fly on a restricted basis and, in March, withdrawn from combat-type activities. Meanwhile there were T-28 operational losses including one that killed Capt. Edwin C. Shank, Jr., on 24 March. These losses further reduced the 1st Air Commando's inventory to the detriment of its combat training mission. To meet the many requests for air support, nine T-28's were borrowed from the VNAF, currently in the process of exchanging these aircraft for single-seat A-1H's. They would be used until two-seat A-1E's, also previously scheduled for the 1st Air Commando Squadron, arrived.* 3

(U) Shortly after these events, certain letters written by Captain Shank, published posthumously, and news articles alleged that U.S. pilots were poorly equipped and flying obsolete aircraft. This triggered Congressional investigations of U.S. air activities in South Vietnam. Secretary Zuckert testified that both the B-26 and T-28 had been drastically changed and carefully tested before being sent overseas and had performed outstandingly. He conceded that in one or two instances of noncombat accidents, structural failure may have been a

* See pp 50 and 59-60.

factor. He defended combat training activities and said that more efficient A-1 Skyraiders were replacing the B-26 and T-28 aircraft used by the 1st Air Commando Squadron and the VNAF.⁴

New Aircraft For the 1st Air Commando Squadron

(S) In September 1963 the Air Force had recommended replacing 1st Air Commando aircraft with two-seater A-1E's. Later it had suggested replacing the B-26's with B-26K's, a radically modified plane. But deliveries could not begin until mid-1964 and 1965, respectively. This circumstance—plus its desire for faster-reacting fighter-bombers and mounting concern over antiaircraft fire and VNAF operational inadequacies—prompted the Air Force to press for interim use of jets. The JCS agreed and asked McNamara's approval to employ B-57's then in Japan. These aircraft were scheduled for redeployment to the United States in June 1964 and transfer to the Air National Guard.⁵

(TS) As administration policy still prohibited jets for combat training in South Vietnam, McNamara turned down the Joint Chiefs' request and said all 1st Air Commando and VNAF fighter aircraft would be replaced by A-1's. On 16 March the JCS ordered the Air Force to carry out his instruction. To assure quick replacement, the A-1 modification program was immediately accelerated.⁶

(TS) Meanwhile, there was also pressure to increase the number of combat training aircraft because of Communist gains and rising

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military and political deterioration in South Vietnam. Statistics on aircraft attrition and casualties were disturbing. They showed that from 1 January 1960 to 4 February 1964 antiaircraft fire accounted for 70 of 113 U.S. personnel killed.⁷

(TS) Backed by reports from Harkins and Felt, the JCS on 29 April asked McNamara to raise the authorized combat training strength from 31 to 50 aircraft and the manpower ceiling to 280 men. Two squadrons of A-1E's, each with 25 aircraft, would permit traditional four-plane flight tactics against ground fire: two for flak suppression and two for combat training strikes on targets while flying escort for helicopters, trains, and vehicles.⁸

(TS) Although McNamara during the March meetings in Saigon and Honolulu had expected that a rapid VNAF buildup would permit an early phase-out of the 1st Air Commando Squadron, on 5 May he approved the JCS request. Simultaneously he approved re-equipping USAF's SAW unit at Eglin AFB, Fla., with the same type of aircraft. As a consequence, 85 A-1E's shortly were designated for modification.⁹

(S) The first six Skyraiders arrived at Bien Hoa AB on 30 May and began operations on 1 June. Air Force officers in the field praised highly the performance of these aircraft. Fifteen Skyraiders had arrived by the end of July. As more were sent to South Vietnam a second combat training unit, the 602d Fighter Squadron (Commando), was established. Authorized 66 personnel, it transferred on 1 October from TAC to PACAF and on the 18th from PACAF to the 2d Air Division.¹⁰

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(S) At year's end the 1st and 602d squadrons possessed 48 Skyraiders. The delivery of nine more early in 1965 would make the 602d fully operational.¹¹

Deployment of B-57's to the Philippines

(S) In justifying the interim use of jets for combat training, PACAF's commander, Gen. Jacob E. Smart, argued that the presence of RF-101's and F-102's in Southeast Asia had not provoked the Communists to escalate the war. Despite the 1954 Geneva Agreement, which prohibited the introduction of new military armament into Vietnam, the administration had approved the use of Army jet-powered helicopters. Smart also observed that the United States had not signed the agreement.¹²

(TS) As Harkins and Felt were in general accord with these views, LeMay on 21 February asked JCS concurrence to transfer three squadrons of B-57 light bombers from Yokota AB, Japan, one to South Vietnam and two to Clark AB, the Philippines. On the 29th the Joint Chiefs agreed and shortly afterwards sent their recommendation to McNamara. They expected quick approval as U.S. officials were seeking new ways to force Hanoi to halt its support of the Viet Cong and Pathet Lao.¹³

(TS) But during the March conferences in Saigon and Honolulu, the Defense Secretary rejected the Joint Chiefs' counsel. He said lack of airpower was not a major problem, the jets would have no

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impact on winning the war, and the issue would only cause difficulties with the State Department. As has been noted,* McNamara directed the replacement of 1st Air Commando B-26's and T-28's by A-1E's.¹⁴

(TS) Although denying the use of B-57's in South Vietnam, McNamara desired their withdrawal from Yokota to make room for other U.S. units. Their departure would also help ease the U.S. balance of payments problem with Japan. As a consequence, the JCS on 30 March again urged their redeployment, but only to Clark AB. Their presence would strengthen the U.S. military position in Southeast Asia.¹⁵

(TS) Still confronted with a critical military situation, McNamara the next day authorized the transfer of 48 B-57's and 1,081 personnel to the Philippines until 30 June 1964. After the State Department worked out the arrangements with the Tokyo and Manila governments, PACAF on 7 May began flying the aircraft to Clark AB.¹⁶

(TS) After another trip to Saigon and Honolulu, McNamara in mid-May extended authority to maintain the B-57's at Clark AB until 1 January 1965, but the prohibition against their use for combat training in South Vietnam was still in effect at the end of the year.¹⁷

Other USAF Augmentations Early in 1964

(U) A rising Communist threat in Laos also brought more USAF aircraft to South Vietnam and Thailand.

(S) In March, a special air warfare (SAW) detachment arrived at Udorn, Thailand. Using 4 T-28's and, later, three C-47's, the

* See p 50.

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detachment trained Lao and Thai pilots. To support Yankee Team missions over Laos, the JCS on 8 June directed the movement of eight F-100's from Clark AB to Da Nang Airport from where they began operations the next day.* The administration's decision to use jets in Laos was due to the different military situation in that country. In July, four RF-101's transferred from Okinawa to Tan Son Nhut, raising to 10 the number of these aircraft at that base.¹⁸

(S) By July, USAF had in Thailand a SAW unit at Udorn, 6 F-100's at Takhli, 4 F-102's at Don Muang, 4 KB-50's at Don Muang and Korat, and 2 H-43B's for search and rescue at Nakhom Phanom near the Laotian border.¹⁹

(S) Including auxiliary and allied aircraft, the 2d Air Division controlled about 155 aircraft in South Vietnam and Thailand on the eve of the Tonkin attack.²⁰

Buildup After the Gulf of Tonkin Incident

(TS) On 4 August, immediately after the Communist attack, McNamara announced the dispatch of reinforcements to Southeast Asia. USAF deployments included three fighter-bomber squadrons from the United States to the Philippines and Japan, and two squadrons of the much-debated B-57's from the Philippines to South Vietnam. The major movements to and within the Pacific area were as follows:²¹

* See p 75.

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<u>Type of Aircraft</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>
KB-50's	4	Yokota AB, Japan	Takhli AB, Thailand
B-57's	36	Clark AB, P.I.	Bien Hoa AB, SVN
F-100's	4	Clark AB, P.I.	Takhli AB, Thailand
F-100's	36	CONUS	Clark AB, P.I.
RF-101's	2	Misawa AB, Japan	Tan Son Nhut AFDL, SVN
RF-101's	6	CONUS	Kadena AB, Okinawa
✓ F-102's	6	Clark AB, P.I.	Da Nang ARPT, SVN
✓ F-102's	6	Clark AB, P.I.	Tan Son Nhut AFDL, SVN
F-105's	18	Yokota AB, Japan	Korat AB, Thailand
F-105's	18	CONUS	Yokota AB, Japan
C-130's	18	CONUS	Clark AB, P.I.
C-130's	18	CONUS	Naha AB, Okinawa

(U) In subsequent weeks additional aircraft arrived or were retained in South Vietnam.

More Transport and Reconnaissance Aircraft

(TS) The Gulf of Tonkin incident hastened a final decision to add a fourth C-123 squadron to the 315th Troop Carrier Squadron. The JCS on 4 August recommended and McNamara on the 7th approved its deployment. On 8 October the unit was activated at Tan Son Nhut and the aircraft arrived shortly afterward. This raised to 64 the number of C-123's in South Vietnam. By December, augmentations brought the total to 72.²²

(TS) To improve night reconnaissance the JCS on 4 September recommended and McNamara approved the dispatch of two more RB-57E's with improved infrared, sensor, and navigation systems. This would provide a total of four "Patricia Lynn" special reconnaissance aircraft for the 13th Technical Reconnaissance Squadron. The third aircraft arrived in December.²³

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Establishment of a Search and Rescue Unit

(S) The July decision to dispatch a professionally trained USAF search and rescue (SAR) unit followed several Army and Marine helicopter personnel losses in rescuing downed USAF and VNAF pilots in South Vietnam.* After approval by the JCS, three H-43F helicopters and crews on temporary duty (TDY) reached Bien Hoa on 14 August. A permanent unit, Detachment 4, Pacific Air Rescue Center, was activated on 20 October. After receiving six HH-43B helicopters and 86 personnel, Detachment 4 became fully operational on 5 November. Three helicopters and crews were placed at Bien Hoa and Da Nang, respectively. Also stationed at Da Nang were three HU-16 flying boats for sea rescue of downed pilots. The H-43F's were sent to rescue units in Thailand.²⁴

Retention of the 19th TASS

(S) A decision also was made to retain 22 O-1's of the 19th Tactical Air Support Squadron (TASS). Used primarily for visual reconnaissance and forward air control (FAC), the 19th was organized at Bien Hoa in July 1963 and scheduled to transfer to the VNAF by 30 June 1964.²⁵

(S) As both the Air Force and the Army used O-1's, the question of whose aircraft should be transferred was debated vigorously. In March 1964, General Harkins reaffirmed the decision to transfer the 19th TASS's O-1's. But the shortage of FAC aircraft prompted the Air Force in April to suggest keeping the 19th's personnel and employing T-28's scheduled

* Previous search and rescue operations in South Vietnam had centered in Pacific Air Rescue Center's Detachment 3. But rescue missions were largely carried out by the U.S. Army and Marine Corps or by the VNAF, often with inadequately equipped helicopters and poorly trained crews.

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for phase-out from both the 1st Air Commando Squadron and the VNAF. The need for more FAC aircraft appeared essential after McNamara, in May, ordered a further buildup of the VNAF.²⁶

(TS) Air Force appeals to retain the 19th were rejected. On 8 August the squadron was deactivated and personnel began to depart. Meanwhile, the Air Force attempted to keep the 19th operating pending receipt of a JCS fact-finding team report. The team subsequently affirmed the shortage of O-1's to meet growing air support needs. With Westmoreland and Sharp now in agreement, the JCS on 15 September informed McNamara that the squadron not only should be retained but its authorized strength increased by 49 officers and 131 enlisted men. Also, more MAP U-17's should be procured for the VNAF in lieu of the USAF O-1's that had been scheduled for transfer.²⁷

(S) On 28 September McNamara agreed with the Joint Chiefs' recommendation but the 19th was not reactivated and reassigned to the 34th Tactical Group until 16 October. In the preceding weeks it had lost many of its personnel and much of its effectiveness. The necessity for USAF O-1's was further supported early in December when the JCS agreed that the 19th should have 30 aircraft and 215 men. It also desired reduced crew-aircraft ratios to permit the assignment of more qualified VNAF O-1 pilots as forward air controllers and air liaison officers. By 31 December McNamara had not rendered a decision on these two proposals.²⁸

(S) Thus successive augmentations during 1964 raised the total of USAF aircraft in South Vietnam by year's end to 221 compared with 117 at the end of 1963. In addition, USAF's overall posture was strengthened measurably by new deployments to Thailand, the Philippines, Japan, and Okinawa. The USAF buildup, especially after the Gulf of Tonkin incident in August, presaged a new phase in the war that would begin in February 1965.²⁹


Airfield Expansion

(TS) The USAF buildup was not without problems. There was aircraft overcongestion on airfields in both South Vietnam and Thailand, aggravating the security problem as demonstrated vividly on 1 November when the Viet Cong attacked Bien Hoa. To lessen the danger, PACAF, on 24 November, ordered the repositioning of several units in South Vietnam to other bases.³⁰

(TS) In addition, airfield expansion was accelerated in both countries, especially at the six primary jet airfields of Tan Son Nhut, Bien Hoa, and Da Nang in South Vietnam and Takhli, Korat, and Don Muang in Thailand. On 29 December OSD approved expenditures for architectural-engineering services for two of the biggest projects: a second runway at Da Nang and a new airfield at Chu Lai on the coast. Work on Can Tho Airport in the Mekong Delta, begun in February 1964, produced a usable runway by October; the project was nearing completion at year's end.³¹ Important expansion was programmed or begun at numerous smaller airfields.

AIRFIELDS IN SOUTH VIETNAM

DECEMBER 1964



* DEPARTMENT OF AIR BASES, A CIVILIAN COMPONENT OF THE VIETNAMESE ARMY.

** VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE

AIRFIELDS NOT LISTED ABOVE ARE NORMALLY THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PROVINCE CHIEF.

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VI. OTHER USAF ACTIVITIES AND PROBLEMS

(U) Throughout 1964 the Air Force continued its training program for the Vietnamese Air Force. It was also concerned with the problems of service representation in MAC/V and rules of engagement for combat training operations.

USAF Support of the Vietnamese Air Force

Expansion of the VNAF

(S) At the end of 1963 the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) possessed 228 aircraft in nine squadrons: 2 fighter (A-1H's and T-28's), 1 tactical reconnaissance (RT-28's and RC-47's), 2 helicopter (CH-34's), 3 liaison (O-1's and U-6's) and 1 transport (C-47's). On 16 December of that year, the VNAF acquired a new commander, Colonel Ky, who quickly won a reputation as a highly motivated and popular leader.¹

(TS) As a result of previous decisions, more aircraft arrived early in 1964. A second A-1H Skyraider squadron was activated in the VNAF during January and flew its first operational mission on 18 March. RT-28D's reached the VNAF in February and aircraft for a third A-1H squadron at the end of April. The Skyraiders came from U.S. Navy resources. Thus Navy personnel performed the operational and maintenance training function.²

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(TS) After his visit to Saigon and Honolulu in March, McNamara submitted new recommendations to the President to enlarge the Vietnamese armed forces. Approved on the 17th, they called for a 50,000-man increase in Vietnamese regular and paramilitary forces and other forms of assistance.³

(TS) As part of the VNAF fighter aircraft buildup, McNamara directed the replacement of all T-28's* by A-1H's, and an increase in A-1H strength from three to four squadrons to enable the South Vietnamese to carry out their own combat support activities. But General Smart asserted that USAF forces would still be needed to "fill the gap," as the VNAF still showed some reluctance to fly at night and on weekends and were often slow in making air strikes. McNamara replied, however, that it would be cheaper to build up the VNAF than to give the USAF more aircraft.⁴

(TS) The Defense Secretary continued to pursue this policy in May when he again visited Saigon and Honolulu. He directed MAC/V to develop a plan for additional expansion of the VNAF and the eventual phase-out of the 1st Air Commando Squadron. His decisions would give the VNAF 339 aircraft by 1 June 1965. These would include 150 A-1H's (six squadrons) and 300 A-1H pilots by February of that year. This goal was attainable, McNamara thought, if the VNAF's pilot-aircraft ratio were raised from 1 to 1 to 2 to 1 to compensate for poor motivation and a low combat sortie rate, and if the incoming RT-28's were

* Many T-28's subsequently were made available for the use of the Thai and Laotian air forces.

exchanged for more Skyraiders. In addition, O-1 squadrons would increase from 2 to 4 (40 to 80 aircraft), and C-47 squadrons from 2 to 3 (32 to 48 aircraft). In subsequent weeks McNamara approved US increases that would boost total liaison aircraft to 120 and helicopters (with a fourth squadron added) to 80.⁵

(S) The Gulf of Tonkin incident in August and the continued military and political decline in South Vietnam showed, however, that the VNAF would not be able to carry the main air burden for counterinsurgency activities in the foreseeable future. More, not less, aircraft were needed despite the VNAF buildup. As noted, in September McNamara agreed with a JCS recommendation to retain the USAF 19th Tactical Air Support Squadron whose O-1's had been scheduled for turnover to the VNAF.* In lieu of the transfer, 20 more U-17's were programmed for the Vietnamese.⁶

The Problem of the 5th and 6th A-1H Squadrons

(TS) There was one exception to the trend in late 1964 toward enlarging both the USAF and VNAF forces. Virtually until the end of the year, administration authorities hoped to phase out the 1st Air Commando Squadron after the VNAF's 5th and 6th A-1H squadrons were activated. After the decision in May to add the latter, Saigon and Pentagon planners wrestled with the problem of establishing realistic activation schedules.

* See p 57.

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(TS) A 2d Air Division plan, staffed through MAC/V and PACOM, initially proposed activating the 5th and 6th squadrons in November 1964 and January 1965, but the Air Staff considered these dates too optimistic. The JCS agreed and, on 24 July, proposed January and March 1965, but McNamara took no action. On 15 October the JCS proposed July and December 1965 but urged retention of USAF's two combat training squadrons until all six VNAF A-1H squadrons were fully operational. Thereafter USAF would keep only a residual training capability in South Vietnam. The Joint Chiefs pointed to the greater Viet Cong activity, aircraft losses by ground fire, and a general insufficiency of aircraft for close support, as justifying extended retention of the USAF capability.⁷

(S) On 6 November McNamara approved the JCS-proposed A-1H activation schedule only. He deferred a decision on retaining the 1st Air Commando Squadron until the fifth VNAF A-1H squadron was operational.⁸

(TS) Because of the worsening military situation, Ambassador Taylor, in December, proposed an additional stretch-out for the last two Skyraider squadrons in order to allow 1st Air Commando and VNAF pilots to use B-57's. This was rejected by the JCS.⁹

The Problem of Jet Aircraft

(TS) As in 1962 and 1963, the possible use of jet aircraft by the VNAF was periodically reviewed. In May 1964, after McNamara had approved the movement of B-57's from Japan to Clark AB, Admiral Felt

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informed the JCS that rising air needs might require the use of the bombers by either the USAF or VNAF while both were changing to A-1's.¹⁰

(TS) Administration policy not to assign jets to the Vietnamese Air Force was unchanged. It authorized, however, six VNAF pilots to take 15 hours each of B-57 familiarization training. By 23 July all six had completed flying and received excellent performance ratings.¹¹

(TS) Although the JCS had agreed to the familiarization program, it believed that the B-57's should remain in USAF hands. VNAF jets, if and when approved, should consist of other types. After the Gulf of Tonkin incident and the sighting of MIG-15's and -17's on an airfield near Hanoi,* the JCS proposed to McNamara the development of a VNAF air defense capability. It suggested sending 15 pilots to the United States for jet training in 1965, and the assignment of 10 F-5's to the VNAF in 1966.¹²

(TS) McNamara disagreed. On 25 September he informed the JCS that the United States rather than the VNAF should provide air defense in the foreseeable future. He also said jets would not contribute to the VNAF's counterinsurgency effort and would compete with other air support resources. In November the JCS resubmitted its recommendation but McNamara again turned it down. The VNAF had not yet attained full capability with four A-1H squadrons, he observed, and accelerated aircraft deliveries for the 5th and 6th A-1H squadrons promised to create more problems.¹³

* See p 27.

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(TS) The JCS made no further effort during the remainder of the year to introduce the jets. General LeMay had favored giving the VNAF a few B-57's but he agreed that none should be assigned until all six A-1H squadrons were operational.¹⁴

Completion of Helicopter Training

(S) In July Air Training Command's 917th Field Training Detachment stationed at Tan Son Nhut completed the training of its last class of VNAF helicopter pilots and mechanics. Begun in January 1963, this helicopter training program was the first the Air Force had conducted outside of the United States. Despite a formidable language problem and the hazards of climate and anti-aircraft fire, the detachment trained 98 pilots and 102 mechanics for the VNAF.¹⁵

VNAF Strength

(S) At the end of 1964 the VNAF possessed 280 aircraft, a net increase of 52 for the year. There were now four fighter squadrons (A-1H's and a few T-28's), four helicopter squadrons (CH-34's), four liaison squadrons (O-1's, U-6's, and U-17's), and one support wing (C-47's and RC-47's), but some authorized aircraft had not yet been received by the units. By 15 January 1965 the VNAF's authorized strength was 11,276 of which 10,849 were assigned. Students in training totaled 1,775--1,430 in Vietnam and 345 in the United States.¹⁶

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Air Force Representation in MAC/V

(TS) Army domination of MAC/V, the top U.S. command structure in South Vietnam, continued to trouble the Air Force during 1964. Of the nine key positions in MAC/V at the beginning of the year, only one (J-5) was held by a USAF officer. Previously, the summer and fall of 1963 when impending vacancies arose in the posts of chief of staff and deputy commander, the Air Force had urged assignment of one of its general officers. Harkins and Felt agreed that at least the chief of staff position should be filled by the Air Force.¹⁷

(S) However, when McNamara withheld his approval, Harkins in March 1964 asked for Army Maj. Gen. Richard G. Stilwell to replace the outgoing chief of staff, Marine Maj. Gen. Richard G. Weede. The JCS split over the issue. Taylor and the Army Chief, General Wheeler, concurred. The Navy and Marine Corps chiefs agreed conditionally, asserting that as a matter of principle all three top MAC/V positions should not be held by the same service. LeMay was opposed. But McNamara, on 10 April, supported the majority opinion.¹⁸

(S) On 12 June the Joint Chiefs split again over filling the post of deputy commander being vacated by General Westmoreland who replaced Harkins as commander on the 20th. (Westmoreland had asked for an Army officer and suggested that a senior Air Force officer, if needed, would be more effective in Bangkok as deputy commander to MAC/Thai.) LeMay and the Navy and Marine Corps chiefs backed an Air Force designee for the post but Taylor and Wheeler supported Westmoreland's request.

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Taylor informed McNamara that in view of the nature of counterinsurgency, it was "hardly conceivable" that the post could be filled from a service other than the Army. On 18 June McNamara again sided with the Army, allowing that service to hold the three top posts in MAC/V.¹⁹

(S) In conjunction with actions on consolidating MAAG/V with MAC/V, the JCS at the end of June asked newly arrived Admiral Sharp, PACOM's commander, to survey the command structure of MAC/V and report on manning and service representation. The survey, however, was delayed due to the heavy U.S. augmentations that followed the administration decisions in July and the Gulf of Tonkin incident on 4 August.²⁰

(S) The U.S. buildup, especially of USAF units, slightly improved the Air Force's command position in Southeast Asia. On 7 August the post of deputy commander, 2d Air Division was established at Udorn, Thailand. There was some initial uncertainty about its function, but it was finally determined that the deputy commander would "conduct, control, and coordinate all USAF matters pertaining to assigned and attached Air Force units, activities, and personnel in support of U.S. and Allied air operations in Laos." This made him responsible to the 2d Air Division rather than to MAC/V. The basic service makeup of MAC/V was unchanged.²¹

(S) Pressing for JCS support to have Sharp prepare as soon as possible a manpower report on MAC/V, General LeMay in late August

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pointed to the trend from a joint to unilateral service (Army) U.S. command structure. This was evidenced not only by the fact that there was only one senior Air Force officer in MAC/V, but also by the subordinate role of USAF advisors and air liaison officers at Vietnamese corps and division level compared to Army advisors, and by the absence of a senior VNAF representative or senior USAF advisor at the Vietnamese Joint General Staff level. Until there were USAF advisors of appropriate rank to advise Vietnamese Army commanders, LeMay said, he could not be assured that USAF and VNAF units were being utilized fully in the war effort. On 2 September he again voiced concern to the JCS, citing the need to improve air-ground coordination in the war against the Viet Cong.²²

(S) Shortly afterward, Admiral Sharp, in conferences with the JCS, indicated that he would abide by McNamara's decisions on filling the top MAC/V posts, although he (Sharp) personally favored appointing an Air Force deputy air commander to MAC/V. In the event the war escalated, he said he would "fight the war" through his component commanders since MAC/V did not have enough skilled Air Force specialists. In deference to Army views, Sharp also indicated that he would not support an Air Force proposal to place USAF full colonels at Vietnamese corps level.²³

(S) On 29 September Westmoreland made a partial concession to the Air Force. He informed Sharp that he would appoint General Moore, the 2d Air Division commander, deputy commander for air operations, a new

post that would be an additional duty for Moore. Sharp supported the recommendation but the Air Staff objected to creating such a lesser position. It would add to Moore's workload and fail to give Headquarters, MAC/V the balanced service representation it needed. The Air Force reiterated its desire for a deputy commander within the Headquarters MAC/V staff structure and hoped Sharp would reconsider his position and support the Air Force's view. Prospects were not encouraging. In November Sharp sent the JCS a new joint table of distribution proposed by MAC/V for additional U.S. manpower that provided for a deputy commander for air operations. At year's end the JCS had not acted on it nor on new proposed MAC/V terms of reference.²⁴

(S) Thus, despite the rapid USAF buildup in Southeast Asia, MAC/V at the end of 1964 remained an Army-dominated command. Its top positions now numbered 10, of which the Army occupied all but two: commander, deputy commander, chief of staff, J-1, J-3, J-4, J-6, and commander of the joint research and test agency (JRATA).^{*} The Marine Corps held the J-2 slot and the Air Force the J-5. The incumbent of J-5, Maj. Gen. Milton D. Adams, had held this post since 7 December 1962.²⁵

Rules of Engagement

(TS) A major Air Force objective was to obtain administration approval to relax the rules of engagement for the 1st Air Commando

* Established 11 February 1964 to bring together all test agencies in South Vietnam.

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Squadron. Adopted in late 1961, these rules authorized operations when the VNAF lacked the necessary training and equipment, combined USAF-VNAF crews were aboard, and the missions were confined to South Vietnam. In addition, the aircraft carried VNAF rather than USAF markings and there were strict target verification procedures. Previous USAF efforts to modify the rules were unsuccessful.²⁶

(TS) Because of the rising need for air support and the slow growth of the VNAF, the 1st Air Commando sortie rate increased. It was felt that more effective air support would be possible if the rules were relaxed, but administration officials retained them for political reasons. Meanwhile, U.S. Army aviation appeared to be interpreting the rules more freely, their armed helicopters carried U.S. markings, and their pilots received more public recognition, a circumstance that greatly troubled the Air Force.²⁷

(TS) In March and May 1964, after visits to Saigon and Honolulu, McNamara reaffirmed the rules for the 1st Air Commando Squadron. The official view was that, despite U.S. assistance, the war was primarily Vietnamese and that there was Presidential understanding that the 1st Commando's activities were temporary until the VNAF "could do the job."²⁸

(S) In April and May the role of the 1st Air Commando became a public issue after the publication in the press and Life magazine of the letters of Captain Shank, who died on 24 March in the crash of a T-28. As noted earlier,* he complained about inadequate aircraft and

* See p 49.

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equipment. But Shank's letters also indicated that the Commando pilots often engaged more in combat than in training. Former Commando pilots and top U.S. officials were called to testify before special Senate and House investigating subcommittees.²⁹

(S) General LeMay took the occasion to urge the JCS to persuade McNamara to change the rules of engagement, as the United States had more to lose than gain by denying a fact of USAF activity in the war.³⁰

(TS) LeMay was unsuccessful. Indeed, on 20 May the JCS tightened the rules of engagement: 1st Air Commando pilots could fly only bona fide combat training missions against hostile targets with VNAF pilots in training and not with Vietnamese "observers" (the intent being to eventually eliminate the squadron and leave combat support to the VNAF); no armed helicopters should be used as a substitute for close air support strikes; and U.S. advisors should be exposed to combat only to the extent that U.S. advisory duties required this.³¹

(S) General Smart, PACAF's commander, believed that the latest JCS guidance left unclear whether 1st Air Commando pilots should "fight or not." Nor was the Air Force's disenchantment with the rules dispelled by MAC/V's continued freer interpretation of them for armed helicopters, despite the injunction against combat-type missions except to protect vehicles and passengers.³²

(S) Four months later military deterioration in South Vietnam again forced a change in the rules. With Westmoreland's and Sharp's support, the JCS recommended that the 1st Air Commando be authorized

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to fly with either VNAF observers or student pilots, to fly with USAF pilots alone for immediate air support if requests were beyond the VNAF's capability or if no VNAF crew member was available,* and to assign a dual training and combat support mission to the 1st Air Commando. On 25 September McNamara agreed to only one change: either a VNAF observer or a student pilot could be used, thus reverting to a practice in effect prior to 20 May. The JCS sent an implementing directive on 14 October.³³

(TS) Meanwhile, the possibility of Communist air activity after the Gulf of Tonkin incident resulted in a general relaxation of the rules of engagement for other USAF and Navy air activities. Decisions in August and September gave General Westmoreland or Admiral Sharp greater authority to engage enemy aircraft over South Vietnam, Thailand, and Laos and in international airspace, and to attack hostile vessels in international waters.³⁴ ✓

* PACAF believed that this change alone would increase the 1st Air Commando's average monthly sortie rate from 497 to 960.

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VII. BEGINNING OF AIR OPERATIONS IN LAOS

(U) As increased Communist activity in Laos also threatened South Vietnam, the administration in 1964 took new measures to bolster the tenuous leftist-neutralist-rightist coalition government of Premier Souvanna Phouma. Laotian neutrality, first guaranteed by the 1954 Geneva Agreement and later by the U-nation declaration of 23 July 1962, was in constant jeopardy because of repeated Communist-led Pathet Lao violations and North Vietnam's use of Laos for infiltrating men and arms to the Viet Cong.¹

Initial Lao and U.S. Air Activity

(S) Although the Royal Laotian Air Force (RLAF) received limited aid under the U.S. military assistance program (MAP), the 1954 and 1962 accords restricted training in that country. To improve the tiny RLAF, in December 1963 PACAF proposed deployment of a USAF special air warfare unit to Thailand. Its presence would permit training of Lao—and perhaps Thai—pilots in counterinsurgency tactics and techniques. In January and February 1964, after coordinating with U.S. Ambassadors in Vientiane and Bangkok and the two governments concerned, OSD and the State Department concurred. On 5 March the JCS directed the Air Force to send a SAW unit to Udorn, Thailand, for six months. General LeMay promptly instructed Headquarters, TAC to dispatch

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Detachment 6, 1st Air Commando Wing with four T-28's and 41 personnel. Nicknamed Water Pump, the detachment arrived at Udorn on 1 April.²

(S) In addition to providing counterinsurgency training, the detachment was to provide logistic support, sponsor Lao-Thai cooperation, and augment, if necessary, the RLAF if the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese forces should resume an offensive. Despite objections of the Chief, Joint U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group, Thailand (JUSMAAG/T),* CINCPAC assigned operational control to the Commander, 2d Air Division because of the similarity of the detachment's mission with that of the 1st Air Commando Squadron in South Vietnam.³

(TS) In April a right-wing coup attempt upset the shaky coalition government. It triggered a resurgence of Pathet Lao attacks on neutralist and right-wing forces in the Plaines des Jarres. When Premier Phouma asked for help, the United States responded by stepping up its aid to the RLAF. It also released ordnance, enabling the RLAF to begin air attacks on Communist positions on 18 May.⁴

(TS) On the same day the JCS directed CINCPAC to use USAF and Navy aircraft for medium and low-level "Yankee Team" missions over the embattled area.[†] On the 19th RF-101's stationed at Tan Son Nhut

*The chief, JUSMAAG/T was the ranking U.S. military officer in Thailand under General Harkins who also served as COMMAC/Thai.

[†]Previous USAF reconnaissance missions over Laos with century-series aircraft began in 1961 under the Pipestem and Able Mable programs. Following the signing of the Laotian neutrality agreement on 23 July 1962, the missions were discontinued on 1 November of that year.

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made the first flight. On the 21st Seventh Fleet RF-8A's and RA-3B's were used to inaugurate the Navy's participation in the program. The 2d Air Division was assigned coordinating responsibility for the Lao-U.S. air operations. Only search and rescue flights were permitted from Thai bases. Air attacks above 20 degrees North latitude were prohibited.⁵

(U) Publicly acknowledging the U.S. operations, the State Department said they were requested by the Laos government because of the inability of the International Control Commission to obtain information on recent attacks on neutralist and right-wing forces. The administration also considered dispatching combat troops to Thailand, as in 1962, in a "show of force."⁶

(TS) Since only the RLAF performed air strikes, more T-28's were urgently needed. At the request of the U.S. Ambassador to Laos, T-28's of Detachment 6, after re-marking, were loaned temporarily to the Laotians giving them a total of seven. On 20 May, 10 more T/RT-28's from South Vietnam (where the 1st Air Commando Squadron and the VNAF were replacing them with A-1's) were loaned to the RLAF. Together with subsequent augmentations, about 33 were available by late June. Because of the pilot shortage, Thai Air Force personnel, with their government's approval, were trained and joined the Laotians in flying operational missions. Some pilots of Air America, a small U.S. contract airline, also received combat training.⁷

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(TS) Meanwhile, the U.S. Ambassador to Laos had asked for MAP-financed C-47's for the RLAF. Admiral Felt and General LeMay immediately endorsed the request. Subsequently concurring, the JCS on 30 June directed the Air Force to provide the necessary training. Three C-47's and 21 personnel were sent to join Detachment 6 in Thailand, arriving there on 24 July. The unit began immediately to give air and ground crew training to the Laotians.⁸

(TS) U.S. Yankee Team missions, begun originally on a temporary basis, were extended by the JCS on 25 May for an indefinite time period. These flights had a fourfold mission: to provide intelligence for friendly Laotian forces including assessment of RLAF bombings, determine the extent of Communist infiltration and aid to the Viet Cong, encourage allies, and demonstrate U.S. resolve to check communism in Southeast Asia.⁹

(TS) Early in June two Navy aircraft were downed in Laos by antiaircraft fire. As a consequence, on the 6th the JCS authorized Yankee Team pilots to engage, with restrictions, in retaliatory fire. For this purpose, USAF deployed eight F-100's from Clark AB, the Philippines, to Da Nang Airfield. On the 9th, supported by SAC KC-135 tankers, several of these aircraft made the first USAF jet strikes of the war against antiaircraft sites and selected military targets. After the Gulf of Tonkin incident, newly arrived USAF F-105's, at Korat AB, Thailand, were employed in conjunction with search and rescue missions only. The changing circumstances led to frequent

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revisions in the rules of engagement. In July seven new or revised rules were issued with respect to reconnaissance, altitude, and retaliatory strikes.¹⁰

(TS) By late June and July Lao-Thai-Yankee Team reconnaissance, interdiction, and airlift operations had been a major factor in stabilizing the military situation in Laos. The defense of Muang Soui, a vital area near the Plaines des Jarres, was bolstered and later an "Operation Triangle" further improved the position of non-Communist forces. Clearly the rapid USAF training of inexperienced Lao and Thai pilots had "paid off" and LeMay commended highly the work of Detachment 6.* In addition to providing valuable information on Communist activity in Laos and infiltration into South Vietnam, Yankee Team and Water Pump missions had raised Laotian morale.¹¹

(TS) In July the JCS approved LeMay's proposal to delegate to CINCPAC more responsibility for air activity in Laos. It desired faster mission approval, relaxation of the rules of engagement, night strikes on Communist convoys on "Route 7," and more direct participation by U.S. and Thai pilots. But Secretary McNamara did not endorse these proposals. High administration policy required the approval of

* In September the JCS extended the detachment's tour for 120 days and in December until September 1965. Also in December LeMay assigned one U-10B and four more men to the detachment to begin a limited medical civic action program for Thai people. At the end of the year the detachment possessed eight aircraft and 66 personnel.

each mission and as available air resources seemed sufficient, there would be no deeper U.S. involvement for the time being in Laos.¹²

(S) To improve command and control of U.S.-Lao-Thai air operations, the post of deputy commander, 2d Air Division was established at Udorn, Thailand, on 7 August.¹³

Plans Against Infiltration

(TS) The more stable military situation in Laos after mid-1964 contrasted with the political and military deterioration in South Vietnam. After the President approved additional planning for air and ground operations in Laos, U.S. diplomatic representatives in Bangkok, Vientiane, and Saigon met with PACOM and MAC/V officials to examine ways to reduce infiltration of men and arms through the Laos corridor. Reaching initial agreement on about 22 targets,* PACOM and MAC/V developed an air-ground plan requiring Yankee Team and RLAF air strikes and U.S.-aided Vietnamese ground attacks a short distance into Laos. The JCS approved the plan on 30 September.¹⁴

(TS) As political disarray in Saigon increased and infiltration appeared more menacing, the JCS in October repeatedly urged McNamara to adopt the 30 September plan that would require, in addition to RLAF operations, considerable Yankee Team participation in striking "hard" targets, suppressing flak, and providing high cover in case North Vietnamese MIG's tried to intervene.¹⁵

* After subsequent OSD-JCS-State Department coordination, the JCS on 10 November approved a list of 28 targets.

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(TS) The plea for more U.S. air support also received the unanimous endorsement of the recently-formed Southeast Asia Coordinating Committee (SEACORD).^{*} The committee desired approval of RIAF strikes on Mia Gia pass, a vital transit point on the Laotian-North Vietnam border. Citing latest intelligence, the committee said that stronger action was needed outside of South Vietnam to produce the desirable psychological and military impact on the Communists. Without U.S. air there might be unacceptable RIAF losses and a doubt as to U.S. resolve in South Vietnam and Laos.¹⁶

(S) But, as noted earlier, the continued political turmoil in Saigon precluded any modification of State-OSD directives and allowed planning only for the proposed air-ground operations in the Laos corridor. General Westmoreland, in late October, foresaw no likelihood of beginning cross-border activity until after 1 January 1965.^{+ 17}

(TS) On 18 and 21 November two USAF Yankee Team aircraft, an F-100 and an RF-101, were lost to ground fire. Whereupon LeMay proposed and the JCS approved a recommendation to conduct retaliatory flak suppression strikes along two infiltration routes. Again, the administration took no action pending another searching reappraisal of U.S.

^{*}In August, General Taylor proposed establishing SEACORD and a military component, SEAMIL, to improve coordination of U.S. policy in Laos, South Vietnam, and Thailand. Washington authorities approved SEACORD in September but as SEAMIL threatened to bypass CINCPAC, it was strongly opposed by the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps chiefs. On 9 December McNamara agreed not to alter the military command structure.

⁺See p 34.

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policy in Southeast Asia. One proposed course of action was to employ U.S. ground forces in the Laos panhandle. The Joint Chiefs had not officially considered such a deployment, and they advised McNamara that it appeared prudent to implement previous JCS recommendations before undertaking ground operations.¹⁸

(TS) On 2 December, after Ambassador Taylor had conferred with NSC and other top U.S. officials, the administration approved very limited and highly controlled measures for exerting more pressure on North Vietnam. They included U.S. strikes on infiltration routes and facilities in the Laotian corridor, armed reconnaissance missions every three days with flights of four aircraft each, but no overflights of North Vietnam. Nicknamed Barrel Roll, the missions had a primarily psychological purpose: to "signal" Hanoi of the danger of deeper U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia. The JCS quickly sent implementing instructions to Admiral Sharp.¹⁹

(TS) After the Laotian government approved the initial targets and routes, Barrel Roll missions began on 14 December. USAF F-100's from Da Nang and F-105's from Thailand flew the first mission. Navy F-4E's and A-1H's began on the 17th. Like Yankee Team, Barrel Roll missions were tightly controlled by Washington.²⁰

(TS) Thus 1964 witnessed the initial employment of limited U.S., Lao, and Thai airpower in Laos. Events in Laos figured increasingly in U.S. planning to thwart a Communist takeover in that country and in defending South Vietnam. By the end of the year Yankee Team aircraft

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of the Air Force and Navy had flown 1,257 photo, escort, and weather sorties. One hundred and fifteen aircraft received ground hits on 56 missions and each service lost two aircraft. By 2 January 1965 six Barrel Roll missions had been flown with no aircraft lost.²¹

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Notes to Pages 1 - 5

NOTES

Unless otherwise noted, all primary sources cited (letters, memos, JCS papers) are located in Headquarters USAF Directorate of Plans File RL (64) and (65) 38-9, depending on the year of the source.

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- ✓ 10. JCSM-746-64, 26 Aug 64 (TS); House Hearings before Subcmte on Appropriations for 1966, pt 3, p 915 (U); MAC/V Comd Hist, 1964, p 68 (TS).
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12. JCS 2343/450, 31 Aug 64 (TS); memo, Chmn JCS to SOD, 9 Sep 64 (TS); Hist, D/Plans, Jul-Dec 64, pp 50-51, 58-59, and 319 (TS); N.Y. Times, 25 Aug 64; Balt Sun, 25 Aug 64; Chicago Tribune, 1 Sep 64.
13. JCS 2343/457, 9 Sep 64 (TS); Balt Sun, 1 Sep 64.
14. NSAM 314, 10 Sep 64 (TS).
15. Hist, CINCPAC, 1964, pp 373-77 and 385-86 (TS); N.Y. Times, 19, 20, and 21 Sep 64.
- ✓ 16. Hist, CINCPAC, 1964, p 55 (TS); Hist, D/Plans, Jul-Dec 64, pp 56-58 (TS); msg 6555, C/S USAF to PACAF, 1 Apr 64 (TS).
17. Memos, C/S USAF to JCS, 2 and 9 Oct 64 (TS); JCS 2343/477, 8 Oct 64 (TS); Hist, CINCPAC, 1964, pp 50-52 (TS).
18. JCS 2343/439, 12 Aug 64 (TS); JCSM-835-64, 30 Sep 64 (TS); Talking Paper for the Chmn JCS for Mtg with Amb Taylor on 30 Nov 64, 29 Nov 64, subj: Proposed Discussion Items (TS); Study, 31 Oct 64, subj: VC Infiltration (S), prep by J-2 Div, Hq MAC/V.

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23. Msgs 50226 and 50227, PACAF to C/S USAF, 20 Oct 64 (TS); Hist, D/Plans, Jul-Dec 64, p 54 (S).
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14. JCSM-955-64, 14 Nov 64 (TS); AF Planners Memo 143-64, 18 Nov 64 (TS).
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17. JCSM-982-64, 23 Nov 64 (TS); Hist, D/Plans, Jul-Dec 64, pp 61-64 (TS).
18. Hist, D/Plans, Jul-Dec 64, pp 61-64 (TS).
19. Ibid; Wash Post, 2 Dec 64; Balt Sun, 4 Dec 64.
20. Hist, D/Plans, Jul-Dec 64, pp 61-66 (TS); memo, Carpenter to C/S USAF, 29 Dec 64, subj: Ops in Laos (TS).
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24. Ibid.
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27. N.Y. Times, 24-31 Dec 64; JCSM-1076-64, 28 Dec 64 (TS); JCSM-70-65, 29 Jan 65 (TS); ltr, Gen. H. Harris, Comdr PACAF to McConnell, 3 Jan 65, no subj (TS).
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4. Memos for rcrd by L/Col W. T. Galligan, Dep Chief, Cong Invest Div, Off of L&L (on Hearings before House Cmte on Armed Services and Senate Preparedness Invest Subcmte), no subj, 21 May-24 Jun 64, (S), in OSAF 101-64. N.Y. Times, 14 and 21 May 64; Balt Sun, 13 and 27 May 64.
5. Charles H. Hildreth, USAF Special Air Warfare Doctrines and Capabilities, 1963 (AFCHO, 1964), pp 50-54 (S); JCSM-211-64, 12 Mar 63 (TS); Hist, D/Ops, Jan-Jun 64, pp 35-36 (S); Hist, Aerospace Progs, Jan-Jun 64, p 37 (S); Hist, 2d AD, Jan-Jun 64, I, pp 61-62 (S); Life Magazine, 4 May 64.
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7. JCSM-350-64; 29 Apr 64 (TS); Hist, 2d AD, Jan-Jun 64, I, pp 51-56 (S); Hist, TAC, Jan-Jun 64, pp 508-09 (S).
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid; Hist, 2d AD, Jul-Dec 64, Vol I, p 69 (S); Hist, Aerospace Progs, Jan-Jun 64, pp 25-26 (S).
10. Hist, Aerospace Progs, Jan-Jun 64, pp 25-26 (S), and Jul-Dec 64, p 33 (S); Hist, 2d AD, Jul-Dec 64, Vol I, p 132 (S).
11. Ibid.
12. Hist, 2d AD, Jan-Jun 64, I, pp 61-62 (S).
13. Ibid; JCS 2343/328, 28 Feb 64 (TS); msg 3-3-46, Hq USAF to PACAF, 2 Mar 64 (TS); JCSM-169-64, 2 Mar 64 (TS); JCSM-193-64, 5 Mar 64 (TS); Hist Rpt, D/Policy, Hq PACAF, Feb 64, p 3 (TS).
14. Msg 51492, PACAF to C/S USAF, 7 Mar 64 (TS).

15. Memo, Carpenter to C/S USAF, 16 May 64, subj: SOD Trip to SVN (S); msgs 37391 and 37408, PACAF to C/S USAF, 14 May 64 (TS); Hist, CINCPAC, 1964, pp 361-64 (TS); msg 13507, C/S USAF to PACAF, 27 Sep 64 (S); memos, SOD to Chm JCS, 20 and 30 Mar 64 (S); JCS 2343/351-4, 25 Mar 64 (TS).
16. Memos, SOD to Chm JCS, 20 and 30 Mar 64 (S); JCS 2343/351-4, 25 Mar 64 (TS); Hist, CINCPAC, 1964, pp 361-64 (TS); Hist, D/Ops, Jan-Jun 64, pp 39-40 (S).
17. Ibid.
18. Hist, 2d AD, Jul-Dec 64, I, pp 62-70 (S); Hist, PACAF, Jan-Jun 64, I, pt 2, ch 5, p 93 (TS).
- ✓ 19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Msg 27228, CINCPAC to C/S USAF, 6 Oct 64 (TS); Hist, CINCPAC, 1964, p 372 (TS); Hist, D/Ops, Jul-Dec 64, p 85 (S).
22. JCSM-665-64, 4 Aug 64 (S); memo, SOD to Chm JCS, 7 Aug 64, same subj (S); Hist, D/Plans, Jan-Jun 64, p 322 (S); Hist, D/Ops, Jan-Jun 64 (S); Hist, SANC (TAC), Jul-Dec 64, pp 72-73 (S); Checo SEA Rpt, Jul-Dec 64, p 59 (TS).
23. JCS 2343/459, 4 Sep 64 (TS); Hist, D/Ops, Jul-Dec 64, p 82 (S); Hist, 2d AD, Jul-Dec 64, I, pp 65 and 68 (S).
24. Memo for recrd by Maj. C. D. Thompson, Dir of Ops, DCS/P&O, 25 Aug 64, subj: SAR Forces (C); Hist, D/Ops, Jul-Dec 64, p 34 (S); Hist, 2d AD, Jan-Jun 64, ch 1, pp 105-110, Jul-Dec 64, I, pp 135-36, and Jul-Dec 64, II, p 22 (S).
25. Hist, D/Ops, Jul-Dec 64, pp 45-46 (S).
26. Ibid; Hist, 2d AD, Jan-Jun 64, ch 1, pp 63-64, and Jul-Dec 64, I, pp 129-33 (S); JCS 2343/451, 28 Aug 64 (S); JCSM-785-64, 15 Sep 64 (S); msg 14632, JCS to CINCPAC, 28 Sep 64 (S).
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2. Rpt of AF Study Gp on VN, May 64 (S); Hist, CINCPAC, 1964, pp 318 and 432 (TS); Chronology of 2d AD, Jan-Jun 64, prep by 2d AD Hist Div, p 6 (U).
3. Msg 54337, PACAF to C/S USAF, 10 Mar 64 (TS); memo, SOD to SA et al, 17 Mar 64, subj: Imp of SVN Prog (S); Hist, Rpt, D/Policy, Hq PACAF, May 64, p 2 (S), in Hist, PACAF, Jan-Jun 64, I, pt 2.
4. Ibid.
5. Memo, M/G. J. K. Hester, Asst Vice C/S to SAF, 29 Jun 64, in OSAF 101-64 (S); memo, L/C J.C. Price, D/Ops to C/S USAF, 11 Dec 64, subj: Supp for SVN (TS); msgs 37391 and 37408, PACAF to C/S USAF, 14 May 64 (TS); msg 2d AD to USAF, 13 May 64 (TS); Hist, CINCPAC, 1964, pp 318-21 (TS); Hist for Asst for Mutual Scety, Jan-Jun 64, pp 49-50 (S).
6. Msg 14632, JCS to CINCPAC, 28 Sep 62 (S); Hist of Mutual Scety, Jul-Dec 64, p 41 (S).
7. Hist, CINCPAC, 1964, pp 318-21 (TS); JCSM-630-64, 24 Jul 64 (S); JCSM-875-64, 15 Oct 64 (S).
8. Memo, SOD to Chmn JCS, 6 Nov 64, subj: VNAF Ftr Sq (S).
9. Msg 60009, C/S USAF to PACAF, 21 Dec 64 (S); msg 20676, PACAF to C/S USAF, 12 Dec 64 (TS).

10. Hist, CINCPAC, 1964, pp 361-64 (TS).
11. Ibid; msg 135-7, C/S USAF to PACAF, 27 Sep 64 (S).
- ✓ 12. JCS 2343/436-1, 25 Aug 64 (TS), msg 91689, C/S USAF to PACAF, 20 Nov 64 (S).
- ✓ 13. Msg 77348, C/S USAF to PACAF, 1 Oct 64 (S); Checo SEA Rpt, Jul-Dec 64, pp 42-43 (TS).
14. Checo SEA Rpt, Jul-Dec 64, pp 42-43 (TS).
15. Hist, 2d AD, Jan-Jun 64, ch I, pp 59-61 (S).
16. Hist, 2d AD, Jul-Dec 64, II, p 116 (S); JMS, Dec 64, p 182 (S); USAF Mgt Summary, 3 Mar 65 (S).
17. Van Staaveren, USAF Plans and Policies in SVN, 1961-1963, pp 46-48 (TS).
18. Ibid; Talking Paper for Chmn JCS for His Mtg with CINCPAC on 8 Sep 64 (S).
19. JCSM-514-64, 12 Jun 64 (S); CM-1427-64, 15 Jun 64, subj: Deputy Comdr MAC/V (S); msg MAC 3077, Westmoreland to Taylor, 18 Jun 64 (S); Talking Paper for Chmn JCS for Mtg with CINCPAC on 8 Sep 64 (S).
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- ✓ 21. Hist, 13th AF, 1964, pp 35-40 (S).
22. Ibid; CSAFM-742-64, 28 Aug 64 (S); CSAFM-754-64, 2 Sep 64 (S).
23. Ltr, Yudkin to PACAF, 28 Sep 64, subj: Trip Rpt, Joint Fact-Finding Team Visit to RVN (S).
- ✓ 24. Msg 21566, CINCPACAF to C/S USAF, 2 Oct 64 (S); msg 61575, C/S USAF to PACAF, 28 Dec 64 (S); msg 33725, CINCPACAF to C/S USAF, 20 Dec 64 (S); Hist, D/Plans, Jul-Dec 64, p 265 (S).
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31. JCS 2343/380, 20 May 64 (S); Talking Paper for Chmn JCS for Discussion with SOD on 2 Nov 64, subj: USAF Activities in SVN (TS).
32. Msg 11003, PACAF to C/S USAF, 6 Jun 64 (S); Hist Rpt, D/Plans, Hq PACAF, Jun 64, pp 2-3, (S), in Hist, PACAF, Jan-Jun 64, I pt 2.
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5. Van Staaveren, USAF Plans and Policies in SVN, 1961-1963, pp 18-19 (TS); Hist, CINCPAC, 1964, pp 269-73 (TS); Hist, PACAF, Jan-Jun 64, I, pt 2, pp 65-73 (TS); Hist, 2d AD, Jan-Jun 64, ch 1, pp 116-20, and ch 2, pp 61-64 (S).
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11. JCS 2344/100, 17 Oct 64 (TS); Hist, PACAF, I, pt 2, ch 5, pp 83-85 (TS); Checo SEA Rpt, Jul-Dec 64, p 4 (TS); Hist, CINCPAC, 1964, pp 262-63 (TS); Hist, D/Ops, Jul-Dec 64, pp 42-43 (S).
- ✓ 12. CSAFM 498-64, 15 Jun 64 (TS); JCSM 595-64, 10 Jul 64 (TS); JCSM-645-64, 29 Jul 64 (TS); memo, SOD to Chmn JCS, 1 Aug 64, no subj.
- ✓ 13. Hist, 13th AF, Vol I, p 35 (S).
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16. CSAFM K-72-64, 23 Nov 64, subj: Mil Action in Laos (TS); Hist, D/Plans, Jul-Dec 64, p 330 (S); Hist, CINCPAC, 1964, pp 21-22 (S).
17. Memo, SOD to Chmn JCS, 21 Oct 64, no subj (S).
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21. Ibid; Hist, CINGPAC, 1964, p 272 (TS).

APPENDIX 1

U.S. Military Personnel in Southeast Asia

31 Dec 64

	<u>Vietnam</u>	<u>Thailand</u>	<u>Total</u>
Army	14,679	3,120	17,799
Navy	1,109	99	1,208
Marine Corps	900	37	937
Air Force	<u>6,604</u>	<u>1,027</u>	<u>7,631</u>
TOTAL	23,292	4,283	27,575

SOURCE: Hist, CINCPAC, 1964, Chart I-6

APPENDIX 2

U.S. Aircraft in Southeast Asia

31 Dec 64

	<u>Vietnam</u>	<u>Thailand</u>	<u>Total</u>
Army	509*	2‡	511
Navy	-	-	-
Marine Corps	29+	-	29
Air Force	<u>221</u>	<u>75</u>	<u>296//</u>
TOTAL	759	77	836

*Consisted of 182 fixed wing and 327 rotary.

+Consisted of 25 rotary and 4 fixed wing. Total as of 27 Jan 65.

‡Consisted of one fixed wing and one rotary.

//Included 13 SAR rotary variously stationed in South Vietnam and Thailand.

SOURCE: Hist of 2d AD, Jul-Dec 64, Vol I, pp 69-70 & Vol II, pp 22, 116; USAF Mgt Survey, 1 Feb 65; MAC/V Command Hist, 1964, pp 59 and 128.

APPENDIX 3

U.S. and Allied Aircraft in Southeast Asia

31 Dec 64

	<u>Vietnam</u>	<u>Laos</u>	<u>Thailand</u>	<u>Total</u>
United States	759		77	836
South Vietnam	280			280
Laos		67 [†]		67
Australia	6 [*]		8	14
New Zealand			2	2
TOTAL	1,045	67	87	1,199

*Six Caribous arrived in Aug 64.

†Includes 18 T-28's and 12 RT-28's received from Vietnam.

SOURCE: Hist of 2d AD, Jan-Jun 64, Ch 1, p 98, Jul-Dec 64, Vol I, pp 22, 25, and 116; USAF Mgt Survey, 1 Feb 64; MAC/V Command Hist, 1964, pp 59 & 128; Journal of Mil Asst, Dec 64, p 167.

APPENDIX 4

USAF Flying Hours and Sorties in South Vietnam

31 Dec 64

<u>Type Aircraft</u>	<u>Flying Hours</u>	<u>Sorties</u>
T-28 [*]	4,073	2,328
B-26 [†]	2,009	622
C-47	5,073	3,659
C-123	37,537	25,327
O-1F	20,020	11,213
RF-101	4,936	2,081
RB-57C	1,328	638
U-3	1,411	161
U-10	2,914	2,015
A-1E [‡]	9,149	2,698
TOTAL	88,450	50,742

*Ended operations in Jun 64.

†Phased out in Mar 64.

‡Began operations in Jun 64.

SOURCE: USAF Mgt Survey, 1 Feb 65.

APPENDIX 5

USAF Aircraft Losses in Southeast Asia

1964

<u>Type Aircraft</u>	<u>Combat losses</u>	<u>Operational losses</u>	<u>Total</u>
T-28	7	2	9*
B-26	1	1	2
C-47	-	1	1
C-123	1	1	2
O-1F	3	-	3
RF-101	1	-	1
RB-57C	-	-	-
B-57	6 [†]	1	7
U-3	-	-	-
U-10	-	1	1
A-1E	7	1	8
F-100	2	-	2
F-105	1	-	1
F-102	-	1	1
K3-50	-	1	1
HH-43	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>
TOTAL	30	10	40

*Includes T-28's loaned to the Royal Laotian Air Force but accountable to the 2d AD.

[†]Destroyed by Viet Cong Attack on Bien Hoa AB, 31 Oct - 1 Nov 64.

SOURCE: Data Control Br, Sys Div, Dir of Ops, DCS/P&O.

APPENDIX 6

U.S. Casualties from Hostile Action in Vietnam

Fatalities	Dec 61-Dec 64	USAF Casualties	1964
Army	181	Killed in action	24
Navy	4	Wounded in action	94
Marine Corps	11		
Air Force	<u>51*</u>		
TOTAL	247		<u>118</u>

*2d Air Division source shows 56 fatalities.

SOURCE: Hist, CINCPAC, 1964, Chart IV-6; Hist of 2d AD, Jul-Dec Vol II, p 29.

APPENDIX 7

VNAF Aircraft Losses

1962-1964

<u>Type Aircraft</u>	1962		1963		1964		<u>Total</u>
	<u>Hostile Action</u>	<u>Acdt</u>	<u>Hostile Action</u>	<u>Acdt</u>	<u>Hostile Action</u>	<u>Acdt</u>	
T-28	2	1	4	3	1	3	14
A-1H	5	1	3	2	12	12	35
U-17			-	-	-	3	3
H-34			1	-	5	1	7
O-1			3	1	2	10	16
C-47				1	-	3	4
U-6					-	-	-
RT-28					1	1	2
UH-19						3	3
L-19							
TOTAL	7	2	11	7	21	36	84

SOURCE: USAF Mgt Survey, 1 Jan and 1 Feb 65.

APPENDIX 8

VNAF Sorties Flown

1964

<u>Type Aircraft</u>	<u>Sorties</u>
T-28	2,958
A-1H	456
C-47	3,561
U-17	984
U-6A and O-1A	21,697
UH-19 and CH-34	<u>14,059</u>
TOTAL	52,715

SOURCE: Data Control Br, Sys Div, Dir of Ops, DCS/P&O

JMA	Journal of Military Assistance
JUSMAAG/T	Joint United States Military Assistance Advisory Group, Thailand
L&L	Legislative Liaison Office
MAAG/V	Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam
MAC/V	Military Advisory Command, Vietnam
MAP	Military Assistance Program
Mil	Military
Mtg	Meeting
NSC	National Security Council
NSAM	National Security Action Memo
NVN	North Vietnam
Off	Office
OSAF	Office of the Secretary of the Air Force
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSD/ISA	Office of the Secretary of Defense, Inter- national Security Affairs
PACAF	Pacific Air Force
PACOM	Pacific Command
P.M.	Prime Minister
Poss	Possible
Prog	Program
Proj	Project
Prov	Province
RLAF	Royal Laotian Air Force
SA	Secretary of the Army
SAFOS	Secretary of the Air Force
SAW	Special Air Warfare
SAWC	Special Air Warfare Center
Scty	Security
SEA	Southeast Asia
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SEACoord	Southeast Asia Coordination Committee
Sit	Situation
SNIE	Special National Intelligence Estimate
SOD	Secretary of Defense
Strat	Strategic
SVN	South Vietnam
TAC	Tactical Air Command

USMAC/V	United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
USMAC/Thai	United States Military Assistance Command, Thailand
USMAAG/V	United States Military Assistance Advisory Group, Vietnam
USAF	United States Air Force
VN	Vietnam
VNAF	Vietnamese Air Force

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27. AFXOPX
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32. PACAF
33. SAC
34. TAC
35. MATS

OTHER

- 36-37. ASI (HAF)
- 38-46. ASI (HA)
- 47-70. AFCHO (Stock)