This August 1964 intelligence report was part of an annual series prepared by the US intelligence community assessing the situation on Fidel Castro’s Cuba.
In this Special Intelligence Estimate submitted in May 1964, the intelligence community assessed the likelihood that the Cubans or Soviets might shoot down a U-2 surveillance plane over Cuba.
This National Intelligence Estimate submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and the US Intelligence Board in June 1963, about 8 months after the Cuban Missile Crisis, was the annual update to its overall situation in Cuba.
This Special National Intelligence Estimate prepared by the CIA in February 1963 in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis assesses the likely reactions if the United States resumed it’s low-level Blue Moon surveillance missions over Cuba. The last low-level mission before this report was flown on November 15, 1962.
In this Special National Intelligence Estimate in November 1962, in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Director of Central Intelligence and the USIB assessed Cuba’s capabilities for aiding and instigating subversion against other Latin American countries.
In this National Intelligence Estimate, Director of Central Intelligence John McCone and the U.S. Intelligence Board studied the situation and prospects in Cuba.